maybe because I’m a computer scientist, right? And the whole field of computer science is founded on the idea that computations can be done on any substrate.
Yes: what’s that to do with consciousness?
It’s intuitive that consciousness is multiply realisable, and functionalism delivers multiple realisability. But there is a problem that functionalism delivers too much realisability : a conscious mind could be implemented by pebbles , or by the “Blockhead”. There is also the problem that MR is in no way a sufficient explanation of consciousness.
So I don’t see how having carbon atoms prevents computations from explaining what’s going on.
If we had an explanation of consciousness, including conscious experience, in terms of physics, we would not need to call on non physical properties to fill the explanatory gap.
If we had an explanation of consciousness, including conscious experience, in terms of computation, we would not need to call on physical properties to fill the explanatory gap
Assuming fictionalism means functionalism ..
Yes: what’s that to do with consciousness?
It’s intuitive that consciousness is multiply realisable, and functionalism delivers multiple realisability. But there is a problem that functionalism delivers too much realisability : a conscious mind could be implemented by pebbles , or by the “Blockhead”. There is also the problem that MR is in no way a sufficient explanation of consciousness.
If we had an explanation of consciousness, including conscious experience, in terms of physics, we would not need to call on non physical properties to fill the explanatory gap.
If we had an explanation of consciousness, including conscious experience, in terms of computation, we would not need to call on physical properties to fill the explanatory gap
We don’t have either explanation.