I don’t know much metaethics jargon, so I’ll just give an example. I believe that moral goodness (or choice-worthy-ness, if you prefer) is proportional to happiness minus suffering. I believe that happiness and suffering are caused by certain physical processes. A system could achieve its goals (that is, do what we would colloquially describe as achieving goals, although I’m not sure how to formalize “goals”) without being happier. For other theories of wellbeing, a system could generally achieve its goals without meeting those wellbeing-criteria.
I don’t know much metaethics jargon, so I’ll just give an example. I believe that moral goodness (or choice-worthy-ness, if you prefer) is proportional to happiness minus suffering. I believe that happiness and suffering are caused by certain physical processes. A system could achieve its goals (that is, do what we would colloquially describe as achieving goals, although I’m not sure how to formalize “goals”) without being happier. For other theories of wellbeing, a system could generally achieve its goals without meeting those wellbeing-criteria.
(Currently exhausted, apologies for incoherence.)
No worries! Seemed mostly coherent to me, and please feel free to respond later.
I think the thing I am hung up on here is what counts as “happiness” and “suffering” in this framing.