I have mixed feelings about this. So, there are basically two reasons why bracketing isnāt orthodox impartial consequentialism:
My choice between A and B isnāt exactly determined by whether I think A is ābetterā than B. See Jesseās discussion in this part of the appendix.
Even if we could interpret bracketing as a betterness ranking, the notion of ābetternessā here requires assigning a weight of zero to consequences that I donāt think are precisely equally good under A vs. B.
I do think both of these are reasons to give less weight to bracketing in my decision-making than I give to standard non-consequentialist views.[1]
However:
Itās still clearly consequentialist in the sense that, well, weāre making our choice based only on the consequences, and in a scope-sensitive manner. I donāt think standard non-consequentialist views get you the conclusion that you should donate to AMF rather than MAWF, unless theyāre defined such that they suffer from cluelessness too.
Thereās an impartial reason why we āignoreā the consequences at some locations of value in our decision-making, namely, that those consequences donāt favor one action over the other. (I think the same is true if we donāt use the ālocations of valueā framework, but instead something more like what Jesse sketches here, though thatās harder to make precise.)
E.g. compare (i) āA reduces x more units of disutility than B within the maximal bracket-set Iā, but Iām clueless about A vs. B when looking outside the maximal bracket-setā, with (ii) āA reduces x more units of disutility than B within Iā, and A and B are equally good in expectation when looking outside the maximal bracket-set.ā I find (i) to be a somewhat compelling reason to do A, but it doesnāt feel like as overwhelming a moral duty as the kind of reason given by (ii).
I have mixed feelings about this. So, there are basically two reasons why bracketing isnāt orthodox impartial consequentialism:
My choice between A and B isnāt exactly determined by whether I think A is ābetterā than B. See Jesseās discussion in this part of the appendix.
Even if we could interpret bracketing as a betterness ranking, the notion of ābetternessā here requires assigning a weight of zero to consequences that I donāt think are precisely equally good under A vs. B.
I do think both of these are reasons to give less weight to bracketing in my decision-making than I give to standard non-consequentialist views.[1]
However:
Itās still clearly consequentialist in the sense that, well, weāre making our choice based only on the consequences, and in a scope-sensitive manner. I donāt think standard non-consequentialist views get you the conclusion that you should donate to AMF rather than MAWF, unless theyāre defined such that they suffer from cluelessness too.
Thereās an impartial reason why we āignoreā the consequences at some locations of value in our decision-making, namely, that those consequences donāt favor one action over the other. (I think the same is true if we donāt use the ālocations of valueā framework, but instead something more like what Jesse sketches here, though thatās harder to make precise.)
E.g. compare (i) āA reduces x more units of disutility than B within the maximal bracket-set Iā, but Iām clueless about A vs. B when looking outside the maximal bracket-setā, with (ii) āA reduces x more units of disutility than B within Iā, and A and B are equally good in expectation when looking outside the maximal bracket-set.ā I find (i) to be a somewhat compelling reason to do A, but it doesnāt feel like as overwhelming a moral duty as the kind of reason given by (ii).