Nice! I like that we are clear on the disagreement now.
Let me substantiate my point then with a couple of examples.
- If you ought to plant an apple tree, it follows that you ought to plant a tree.
- If you ought to donate to GiveWell, it follows that you ought to donate to charity.
And so on.
Whenever you ought to do an a specific action of kind A, it follows that you ought to do an action of kind A. (This follows by existential generalization, if you want to go down into the symbolic logic of the argument.)
Furthermore, it can be true that you ought to do an action of kind A, even though, for some specific action t of kind A, if is not true that you ought to do t.
For example:
It can be true that you ought to teach your children manners, even if it is not true that you ought to physically punish your children until they learn manners.
It can be true that you ought to bring your mother a gift for her birthday, even if it is not true that you ought to give her a Ferrari for her birthday.
And so on.
… That’s why I don’t agree with your last point “I believe for this to hold you would need to know that [CAFOs < 0] is impossible, not just that [CAFOs > 0] is possible.”
Okay. Thank you for your patience. I understand your point, and agree with the formal argument.
However, I still disagree. I don’t know how to explain why without using some maths.
Let A be a subset of B, both sets of actions. Let G be the set of actions that we ought to do.
Existential generalization is something like
If exists x in A ^ G, exists x in B ^ G.
But this is not how I would expect readers to understand “we ought to build more confined animal feeding operations” in your abstract. This reads like a general recommendation, or even an unqualified/universal statement, not like an existential.
And let me add: even if the formal argument is airtight in your examples, it doesn’t sound as obvious (in my intuition, it sounds obviously wrong) in your original case. This suggests that the same words mean different things in the different contexts, at least in how I’m reading it.
What I’m understanding from what you’re saying is this: some people might read my abstract and think that I argue that, if we ought to maximize net aggregate welfare, then we ought to build CAFOs of any kind, including ones in which animals have net negative welfare. Then they read my article and find out that, actually, my argument shows that if we ought to maximize net aggregate welfare, then we ought to build CAFOs of certain kinds, in which animals have net positive welfare. And they might feel disappointed or mislead by that.
To which my response is: Fair! Explaining the difference between CAFOs in which animals have net negative welfare and CAFOs in which they have net positive welfare in the abstract could potentially have forestalled certain misunderstandings.
If only because I read this whole comment chain, I’ll add: I agree, Vera, this sentence is logically correct, but I agree with Clara that it seems like a significant risk of misinterpretation, especially since we should expect far more people will read the abstract than the article itself.
Thanks, Jacob! From my perspective, the difference between CAFOs with negative welfare and those with slightly positive welfare is not very significant. Using metaphors, the zero point is often described by comparing it with suicidality. People with 0 welfare are indifferent wrt suicide. CAFOs with chickens whose welfare level is only a hair better than that do not appear like a good thing to me. As I say in the paper, a world with a small number of blissful chickens seems clearly better to me than a world with a large number of miserable chickens, even if their welfare is above 0. Since, from my perspective, the difference between CAFOs with positive and those with negative welfare is not very significant, this did not seem like a strong risk of misinterpretation to me. I can see that this would seem different, however, if for you the 0 welfare inflection point is crucially important.
Ah, that reasoning makes sense! From my perspective, the difference is (by definition) small, but (again, by definition) very meaningful since it differentiates lives worth creating and those that are not.
Thank you for spelling out your reasoning in such a transparent way. I think our disagreement is not a matter of stylistic preferences.
I believe the following is incorrect:
If [we should build more CAFOs of the kind in which animals have above 0 welfare], then [we should build more CAFOs].
Let me rephrase your argument as
If [CAFOs > 0 is should] then [CAFOs is should].
I believe for this to hold you would need to know that [CAFOs < 0] is impossible, not just that [CAFOs > 0] is possible.
Nice! I like that we are clear on the disagreement now.
Let me substantiate my point then with a couple of examples.
- If you ought to plant an apple tree, it follows that you ought to plant a tree.
- If you ought to donate to GiveWell, it follows that you ought to donate to charity.
And so on.
Whenever you ought to do an a specific action of kind A, it follows that you ought to do an action of kind A. (This follows by existential generalization, if you want to go down into the symbolic logic of the argument.)
Furthermore, it can be true that you ought to do an action of kind A, even though, for some specific action t of kind A, if is not true that you ought to do t.
For example:
It can be true that you ought to teach your children manners, even if it is not true that you ought to physically punish your children until they learn manners.
It can be true that you ought to bring your mother a gift for her birthday, even if it is not true that you ought to give her a Ferrari for her birthday.
And so on.
… That’s why I don’t agree with your last point “I believe for this to hold you would need to know that [CAFOs < 0] is impossible, not just that [CAFOs > 0] is possible.”
Okay. Thank you for your patience. I understand your point, and agree with the formal argument.
However, I still disagree. I don’t know how to explain why without using some maths.
Let A be a subset of B, both sets of actions. Let G be the set of actions that we ought to do.
Existential generalization is something like
If exists x in A ^ G, exists x in B ^ G.
But this is not how I would expect readers to understand “we ought to build more confined animal feeding operations” in your abstract. This reads like a general recommendation, or even an unqualified/universal statement, not like an existential.
And let me add: even if the formal argument is airtight in your examples, it doesn’t sound as obvious (in my intuition, it sounds obviously wrong) in your original case. This suggests that the same words mean different things in the different contexts, at least in how I’m reading it.
Thanks, Clara.
What I’m understanding from what you’re saying is this: some people might read my abstract and think that I argue that, if we ought to maximize net aggregate welfare, then we ought to build CAFOs of any kind, including ones in which animals have net negative welfare. Then they read my article and find out that, actually, my argument shows that if we ought to maximize net aggregate welfare, then we ought to build CAFOs of certain kinds, in which animals have net positive welfare. And they might feel disappointed or mislead by that.
To which my response is: Fair! Explaining the difference between CAFOs in which animals have net negative welfare and CAFOs in which they have net positive welfare in the abstract could potentially have forestalled certain misunderstandings.
Yes. I’m one of those possible people. I’m happy to have reached mutual understanding.
If only because I read this whole comment chain, I’ll add: I agree, Vera, this sentence is logically correct, but I agree with Clara that it seems like a significant risk of misinterpretation, especially since we should expect far more people will read the abstract than the article itself.
I’m still curious, apart from how I worded the abstract, what’s your take on the substance of the argument? If you’re willing to share!
Yup, I posted a longer top-level comment.
Thank you! I’ll think it through and get back to you in 1-2 days.
Thanks, Jacob! From my perspective, the difference between CAFOs with negative welfare and those with slightly positive welfare is not very significant. Using metaphors, the zero point is often described by comparing it with suicidality. People with 0 welfare are indifferent wrt suicide. CAFOs with chickens whose welfare level is only a hair better than that do not appear like a good thing to me. As I say in the paper, a world with a small number of blissful chickens seems clearly better to me than a world with a large number of miserable chickens, even if their welfare is above 0. Since, from my perspective, the difference between CAFOs with positive and those with negative welfare is not very significant, this did not seem like a strong risk of misinterpretation to me. I can see that this would seem different, however, if for you the 0 welfare inflection point is crucially important.
Ah, that reasoning makes sense! From my perspective, the difference is (by definition) small, but (again, by definition) very meaningful since it differentiates lives worth creating and those that are not.