Effective altruists subscribe to a version of utilitarianism according to which actions are to be judged by their consequences.
While many EAs subscribe to utilitarianism, many others don’t. Andreas Mogensen is just one example. The movement doesn’t officially endorse utilitarianism either, as you can see in the objections here.
He draws out welfarism and aggregationism as core commitments of the view. It’s clear that there are many versions of utilitarianism, as well as many versions of welfarism (stronger an weaker) and many ways of aggregating welfare.
The main difference between utilitarianism and EA that MacAskill draws out is that utiliarians think you’re doing something wrong when you’re not maximizing utility, while EAs (on this presentation) don’t think that. MacAskill describes EA as a “project”, not a normative theory.
By “effective altruist” you can mean someone who is a member of the EA community. That’s who you seem to have in mind. Members of the EA community of course are a heterogenous group, they hold many different views. Or you can mean someone who believes in the core commitments outlined above and is motivated by them. That’s who I had in mind.
I agree with you that the phrasing “subscribing to a version of utilitarianism” slides over some nuances, since, as I said, effective altruism is not a normative theory. My text goes on to explain what I mean though.
Thanks for your answer, Vera. I think there’s a significant issue with how the article comes across to readers. While it’s clear that your text addresses a specific EA—the utilitarian type—the article reads as though it’s describing the entire EA community rather than a very particular subspecies of it. Additionally, I find the framing of “philosophical foundations of EA” problematic. These (or other) philosophies may have been an inspiration or influence for some people in the movement, but the project of EA is not based on these “foundations” in the way your article suggests. If the article clearly signaled upfront that it’s analyzing one particular philosophical approach within EA rather than EA as a whole, that would avoid much of this confusion (but it would be less engaging, I guess).
Your concern was actually on my mind when writing a paper, and I made sure to address it head-on repeatedly. Let me just point to a few of the passages in the article that clearly refer to variations in the EA and effective animal advocacy movements:
“Effective animal advocates want to help animals as effectively as possible. I explore a popular way of spelling out this idea, according to which...” (second sentence in the abstract)
“Many effective animal advocates do not subscribe to a specific philosophical view but rather want to ‘help animals as effectively as possible.’ But if we try to add more specificity to this idea, the most popular interpretation is that when choosing between two actions to help animals, we should pick the one that maximizes the net aggregate welfare of animals.” (first paragraph of the article)
“I call this more specific thesis effective animal altruism (EAA).” (Coining of the term “Effective Animal Altruism”, in contrast to the more broadly used “Effective Animal Advocacy”, to pick out a specific subgroup) (first paragraph).
“If the goal is to ‘benefit animals as much as possible,’ we need a different way of explaining what that means.” (last line of the article)
My ascriptions of philosophical foundations to the movement was based on published articles by Will MacAskill, widely described as one of the founders or “originators” of the EA movement, with titles such as “What is Effective Altruism?” or “The definition of Effective Altruism”, along with the book “Doing Good Better”. Of course, as with any social movement, it is to be expected that there is a lot of variations in what individual members of the movement think and say.
I guess phrases like the one cited above, or “I hope that by drawing attention to a central philosophical problem of the approach, it will encourage animal advocates to look for alternatives, both philosophical and strategic.” made me think that your view was that EAs were already committed (in some way or other) to some utilitarian type of philosophical foundation. I’ll reread your article more carefully to see if I got it all wrong or if there’s some ambiguity at play here.
While many EAs subscribe to utilitarianism, many others don’t. Andreas Mogensen is just one example. The movement doesn’t officially endorse utilitarianism either, as you can see in the objections here.
Hi Joe,
My understanding of the relationship betwee effective altruism and utilitarianism is informed by this article by Will MacAskill on “What Is Effective Altruism”: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5506078de4b02d88372eee4e/t/68ac5735dad92b460f97786d/1756124981213/What+Is+Effective+Altruism+International+Encyclopedia+of+Ethics.pdf
He draws out welfarism and aggregationism as core commitments of the view. It’s clear that there are many versions of utilitarianism, as well as many versions of welfarism (stronger an weaker) and many ways of aggregating welfare.
The main difference between utilitarianism and EA that MacAskill draws out is that utiliarians think you’re doing something wrong when you’re not maximizing utility, while EAs (on this presentation) don’t think that. MacAskill describes EA as a “project”, not a normative theory.
By “effective altruist” you can mean someone who is a member of the EA community. That’s who you seem to have in mind. Members of the EA community of course are a heterogenous group, they hold many different views. Or you can mean someone who believes in the core commitments outlined above and is motivated by them. That’s who I had in mind.
I agree with you that the phrasing “subscribing to a version of utilitarianism” slides over some nuances, since, as I said, effective altruism is not a normative theory. My text goes on to explain what I mean though.
Vera
Thanks for your answer, Vera. I think there’s a significant issue with how the article comes across to readers. While it’s clear that your text addresses a specific EA—the utilitarian type—the article reads as though it’s describing the entire EA community rather than a very particular subspecies of it. Additionally, I find the framing of “philosophical foundations of EA” problematic. These (or other) philosophies may have been an inspiration or influence for some people in the movement, but the project of EA is not based on these “foundations” in the way your article suggests. If the article clearly signaled upfront that it’s analyzing one particular philosophical approach within EA rather than EA as a whole, that would avoid much of this confusion (but it would be less engaging, I guess).
Hi Leo,
Your concern was actually on my mind when writing a paper, and I made sure to address it head-on repeatedly. Let me just point to a few of the passages in the article that clearly refer to variations in the EA and effective animal advocacy movements:
“Effective animal advocates want to help animals as effectively as possible. I explore a popular way of spelling out this idea, according to which...” (second sentence in the abstract)
“Many effective animal advocates do not subscribe to a specific philosophical view but rather want to ‘help animals as effectively as possible.’ But if we try to add more specificity to this idea, the most popular interpretation is that when choosing between two actions to help animals, we should pick the one that maximizes the net aggregate welfare of animals.” (first paragraph of the article)
“I call this more specific thesis effective animal altruism (EAA).” (Coining of the term “Effective Animal Altruism”, in contrast to the more broadly used “Effective Animal Advocacy”, to pick out a specific subgroup) (first paragraph).
“If the goal is to ‘benefit animals as much as possible,’ we need a different way of explaining what that means.” (last line of the article)
My ascriptions of philosophical foundations to the movement was based on published articles by Will MacAskill, widely described as one of the founders or “originators” of the EA movement, with titles such as “What is Effective Altruism?” or “The definition of Effective Altruism”, along with the book “Doing Good Better”. Of course, as with any social movement, it is to be expected that there is a lot of variations in what individual members of the movement think and say.
Vera
I guess phrases like the one cited above, or “I hope that by drawing attention to a central philosophical problem of the approach, it will encourage animal advocates to look for alternatives, both philosophical and strategic.” made me think that your view was that EAs were already committed (in some way or other) to some utilitarian type of philosophical foundation. I’ll reread your article more carefully to see if I got it all wrong or if there’s some ambiguity at play here.