Executive summary: Andreas Mogensen argues for a pluralist theory of moral standing based on welfare subjectivity and autonomy, challenging the necessity of phenomenal consciousness for moral status.
Key points:
Mogensen introduces a pluralist theory that supports moral standing through either welfare subjectivity or autonomy, independent of each other.
He questions the conventional belief that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing, introducing autonomy as an alternative ground.
The paper distinguishes between the morality of respect and the morality of humanity, highlighting their relevance to different beings.
It explores the possibility that certain beings could be governed solely by the morality of respect without being welfare subjects.
Mogensen outlines conditions for autonomy that do not require welfare subjectivity, suggesting that autonomy alone can merit moral respect.
The implications of this theory for future ethical considerations of AI systems are discussed, stressing the need to revisit the relationship between consciousness and moral standing.
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Executive summary: Andreas Mogensen argues for a pluralist theory of moral standing based on welfare subjectivity and autonomy, challenging the necessity of phenomenal consciousness for moral status.
Key points:
Mogensen introduces a pluralist theory that supports moral standing through either welfare subjectivity or autonomy, independent of each other.
He questions the conventional belief that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing, introducing autonomy as an alternative ground.
The paper distinguishes between the morality of respect and the morality of humanity, highlighting their relevance to different beings.
It explores the possibility that certain beings could be governed solely by the morality of respect without being welfare subjects.
Mogensen outlines conditions for autonomy that do not require welfare subjectivity, suggesting that autonomy alone can merit moral respect.
The implications of this theory for future ethical considerations of AI systems are discussed, stressing the need to revisit the relationship between consciousness and moral standing.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.