This analysis is overly simplistic and highly flawed. The main issue with this model is that nuclear escalation is a 2 player game, but there is almost no analysis of the actual motivations and payoffs of each player.
As others have pointed out, the odds of being overthrown if russia withdraws are very far from “almost certain”. Dictators are actually pretty good at holding onto power, even in the face of destabilising force. Also, attempting to use nukes could also trigger an overthrow, possibly with greater chance.
If russia tries to use a couple of tactical nukes on the battlefield, it does not guarantee any victory. Ukraines army is spread out, and would only get more motivated seeing their country attacked. The US abandoned it’s tactical nukes for this reason.
Now, looking at NATO’s perspective, if russia uses tactical nukes, assigning a probability of 20% of no NATO response is ridiculous, it’s closer to 0%. If they let that precedent stand, then any nuclear power would be able to nuke and annex any of their neighbours with impunity. They have to establish the precedent that using nukes in a conventional war is counterproductive, or risk endless nuclear attacks in the future, by inflicting damage on russia that cancels out the benefits of the tactical nukes.
If putin does deploy nukes, and then nato responds by sinking their fleet or whatever, what is the motivation for putin to escalate further? Nuclear war is still a loss for russia. He would be placing everything on a gamble that NATO gives in to nuclear blackmail, when they literally just demonstratedthat they wouldn’t.
The smart move for Russia is to continuously threaten to use nukes, but never to go ahead with them. The threat of nukes is keeping NATO out of the war, limiting what arms ukraine recieves, and diminishing support for ukraine from westerners scared of nukes. All that goes out the window if they actually do the insane thing. Not using nukes is the tactically sound option here.
Really, the actual question you need to ask is how insane Putin is, and whether he mistakenly thinks the west will give in to nuclear blackmail. If he’s at all rational, the nukes are staying in their bays.
This analysis is overly simplistic and highly flawed. The main issue with this model is that nuclear escalation is a 2 player game, but there is almost no analysis of the actual motivations and payoffs of each player.
As others have pointed out, the odds of being overthrown if russia withdraws are very far from “almost certain”. Dictators are actually pretty good at holding onto power, even in the face of destabilising force. Also, attempting to use nukes could also trigger an overthrow, possibly with greater chance.
If russia tries to use a couple of tactical nukes on the battlefield, it does not guarantee any victory. Ukraines army is spread out, and would only get more motivated seeing their country attacked. The US abandoned it’s tactical nukes for this reason.
Now, looking at NATO’s perspective, if russia uses tactical nukes, assigning a probability of 20% of no NATO response is ridiculous, it’s closer to 0%. If they let that precedent stand, then any nuclear power would be able to nuke and annex any of their neighbours with impunity. They have to establish the precedent that using nukes in a conventional war is counterproductive, or risk endless nuclear attacks in the future, by inflicting damage on russia that cancels out the benefits of the tactical nukes.
If putin does deploy nukes, and then nato responds by sinking their fleet or whatever, what is the motivation for putin to escalate further? Nuclear war is still a loss for russia. He would be placing everything on a gamble that NATO gives in to nuclear blackmail, when they literally just demonstrated that they wouldn’t.
The smart move for Russia is to continuously threaten to use nukes, but never to go ahead with them. The threat of nukes is keeping NATO out of the war, limiting what arms ukraine recieves, and diminishing support for ukraine from westerners scared of nukes. All that goes out the window if they actually do the insane thing. Not using nukes is the tactically sound option here.
Really, the actual question you need to ask is how insane Putin is, and whether he mistakenly thinks the west will give in to nuclear blackmail. If he’s at all rational, the nukes are staying in their bays.