Though I buy the argument that the risk is much higher than we think, the specific logic here probably underestimates the likelihood that Putin himself as the weaker party de-escalates VS actually uses nuclear weapons in the first place.
His pattern of behaviour thus far has been that of an opportunistic gambler—he does whatever he can get away with at the lowest cost to him, often resorting to bluffing and threats (including nuclear threats, this is not new), but will go no further.
If you give him what he wants without a fight, he’ll say “fantastic” and move on to the next prize. When things aren’t going his way he will try “please just let me win or I will use NUCLEAR WEAPONS” on the off chance it works. When it doesn’t he just forgets about it and starts plotting his next gamble.
A few past examples establishing the pattern:
he could kill hundreds of thousands of his opponents like Stalin did. Instead he assassinates s a few of them with poison, or has them mysteriously fall out of a fourth floor window, to send a message
he could’ve escalated in Georgia in 2008 but settled for a frozen conflict instead
he could’ve fully invaded Ukraine in 2014, but chose to stop before it became too costly
he made sure his proxy intervention in Syria didn’t lead to open conflict with the US
his intervention in the 2016 US elections was cloaked in plausible deniability, in case it didn’t work out
earlier this year he could’ve persisted in his original plan to take Kiev, but instead retreated to a much less ambitious strategy
This isn’t the behaviour of a madman—more like that of a careful predator who would very much like to eat you if you would so oblige, but also very much like to survive.
(Another potential giveaway is the hidden palace as well as all the stolen billions. He may hold deluded reactionary opinions but is not personally deluded enough that he cannot appreciate the finer things in life. You are more likely to find a messianic kamikaze type in a cave or a bunker, modelling austerity for his troops.)
Given that there are many ways Putin could live, stay in power, and even save face without using nuclear weapons—“declare victory, end conscription, go home” and “ruthlessly get rid of any internal opponents” being a few of them—my prior is that it is much more likely he will use one of those in a Vietnam scenario.
Of course none of this means we should argue for escalation on our end, the situation is dangerous enough as it is.
Though I buy the argument that the risk is much higher than we think, the specific logic here probably underestimates the likelihood that Putin himself as the weaker party de-escalates VS actually uses nuclear weapons in the first place.
His pattern of behaviour thus far has been that of an opportunistic gambler—he does whatever he can get away with at the lowest cost to him, often resorting to bluffing and threats (including nuclear threats, this is not new), but will go no further.
If you give him what he wants without a fight, he’ll say “fantastic” and move on to the next prize. When things aren’t going his way he will try “please just let me win or I will use NUCLEAR WEAPONS” on the off chance it works. When it doesn’t he just forgets about it and starts plotting his next gamble.
A few past examples establishing the pattern:
he could kill hundreds of thousands of his opponents like Stalin did. Instead he assassinates s a few of them with poison, or has them mysteriously fall out of a fourth floor window, to send a message
he could’ve escalated in Georgia in 2008 but settled for a frozen conflict instead
he could’ve fully invaded Ukraine in 2014, but chose to stop before it became too costly
he made sure his proxy intervention in Syria didn’t lead to open conflict with the US
his intervention in the 2016 US elections was cloaked in plausible deniability, in case it didn’t work out
earlier this year he could’ve persisted in his original plan to take Kiev, but instead retreated to a much less ambitious strategy
This isn’t the behaviour of a madman—more like that of a careful predator who would very much like to eat you if you would so oblige, but also very much like to survive.
(Another potential giveaway is the hidden palace as well as all the stolen billions. He may hold deluded reactionary opinions but is not personally deluded enough that he cannot appreciate the finer things in life. You are more likely to find a messianic kamikaze type in a cave or a bunker, modelling austerity for his troops.)
Given that there are many ways Putin could live, stay in power, and even save face without using nuclear weapons—“declare victory, end conscription, go home” and “ruthlessly get rid of any internal opponents” being a few of them—my prior is that it is much more likely he will use one of those in a Vietnam scenario.
Of course none of this means we should argue for escalation on our end, the situation is dangerous enough as it is.