I am also confused by the suggested outcomes, e.g. I don’t see how Russian victory could be either analagous to Kosovo or accurately described as “breakaway succeeds”, since Putin has now abandoned the pretence of seeking to support DPR/LPR as independent states. I would suggest the following are rough possible outcomes:
Russia, Ukraine and most other states cease to exist following widespread nuclear war.
Russia annexes Ukraine.
Russia annexes Ukraine east of the Dnipro, establishes a puppet state in the remainder.
Russia holds (and Ukraine cedes) the territory it has already annexed. Likely unstable.
War reaches stalemate, but continues indefinitely. Strictly speaking not an outcome, as the war will end eventually, but I’m envisaging these as outcomes within the next few years.
Independent Donbas with security guaranteed by Russia? Previously seemed to be a possible outcome, but not sure how we could get there from here.
Restoration of the ante bellum status quo. Likely unstable, as we’ve just seen.
Russia withdraws from eastern Ukraine; Ukraine cedes Crimea.
Russia withdraws from all of Ukraine.
I think it’s clear that at the start of the war, Ukraine would have viewed 7 and certainly 8 as victories, but now only views 9 as a victory. Russia is hard to read, but I would guess that something like 3 was the initial war aim and that they would now be content with 4.
The question is, is there a deal there? E.g. would the belligerents settle for 7? At present, I think the answer is a firm no from both sides, so the war continues. Both sides currently believe they can do better on the battlefield than the best deal they could achieve by a negotiated peace and the war will continue until that is not the case.
The question at hand is, can Putin improve his position by using a nuclear weapon? This I think is where OP goes wrong. 1 is not a good outcome for Putin, but Putin calculates just as we do that the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine has a high probability of leading to an escalation sprial and then outcome 1. Another possibility would be that Russia folds in the face of NATO escalation, in which case outcome 9 occurs, which is also bad for Putin.
The only “good” possibility is that NATO declines to respond, but that would likely only be the case if the nuclear weapon use were relatively inconsequential. But if it was inconsequential, it would also fail to alter the course of the war.
Also, Putin is probably genuine (though mistaken) in considering Ukraine to be an integral part of Russia, and he likely wouldn’t want to nuke sites he considers culturally important to Russia. Ruling over the smouldering ruins of Kyiv is probably not an outcome he favours.
What is said by OP, is that Putin personally wouldn’t survive outcome 9, but why should this be? He successfully ruled Russia without Crimea for many years. Either he rules Russia with a hand of iron or he doesn’t. If he does, he can survive withdrawing to the internationally recognised border. If he doesn’t, he’s probably toast already. Either way, he isn’t actually improving his position by using a nuclear weapon.
In conclusion, I don’t think there is a rational use case for nuclear weapons here. The risk is that Putin may behave irrationally, and for that reason I put the risk at around 5%. I concur in OP’s calculations after that point.
Outside view: OP says <10% chance Putin would accept losing without first going nuclear, but also says, “there appears to be a widespread assumption in the West, shared by Ukrainian leaders, that Ukraine is winning and that Putin will grudgingly accept “Vietnam”.” There is no sufficient reason for OP to prefer his own analysis to that of Western and Ukrainian leaders.
I am also confused by the suggested outcomes, e.g. I don’t see how Russian victory could be either analagous to Kosovo or accurately described as “breakaway succeeds”, since Putin has now abandoned the pretence of seeking to support DPR/LPR as independent states. I would suggest the following are rough possible outcomes:
Russia, Ukraine and most other states cease to exist following widespread nuclear war.
Russia annexes Ukraine.
Russia annexes Ukraine east of the Dnipro, establishes a puppet state in the remainder.
Russia holds (and Ukraine cedes) the territory it has already annexed. Likely unstable.
War reaches stalemate, but continues indefinitely. Strictly speaking not an outcome, as the war will end eventually, but I’m envisaging these as outcomes within the next few years.
Independent Donbas with security guaranteed by Russia? Previously seemed to be a possible outcome, but not sure how we could get there from here.
Restoration of the ante bellum status quo. Likely unstable, as we’ve just seen.
Russia withdraws from eastern Ukraine; Ukraine cedes Crimea.
Russia withdraws from all of Ukraine.
I think it’s clear that at the start of the war, Ukraine would have viewed 7 and certainly 8 as victories, but now only views 9 as a victory. Russia is hard to read, but I would guess that something like 3 was the initial war aim and that they would now be content with 4.
The question is, is there a deal there? E.g. would the belligerents settle for 7? At present, I think the answer is a firm no from both sides, so the war continues. Both sides currently believe they can do better on the battlefield than the best deal they could achieve by a negotiated peace and the war will continue until that is not the case.
The question at hand is, can Putin improve his position by using a nuclear weapon? This I think is where OP goes wrong. 1 is not a good outcome for Putin, but Putin calculates just as we do that the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine has a high probability of leading to an escalation sprial and then outcome 1. Another possibility would be that Russia folds in the face of NATO escalation, in which case outcome 9 occurs, which is also bad for Putin.
The only “good” possibility is that NATO declines to respond, but that would likely only be the case if the nuclear weapon use were relatively inconsequential. But if it was inconsequential, it would also fail to alter the course of the war.
Also, Putin is probably genuine (though mistaken) in considering Ukraine to be an integral part of Russia, and he likely wouldn’t want to nuke sites he considers culturally important to Russia. Ruling over the smouldering ruins of Kyiv is probably not an outcome he favours.
What is said by OP, is that Putin personally wouldn’t survive outcome 9, but why should this be? He successfully ruled Russia without Crimea for many years. Either he rules Russia with a hand of iron or he doesn’t. If he does, he can survive withdrawing to the internationally recognised border. If he doesn’t, he’s probably toast already. Either way, he isn’t actually improving his position by using a nuclear weapon.
In conclusion, I don’t think there is a rational use case for nuclear weapons here. The risk is that Putin may behave irrationally, and for that reason I put the risk at around 5%. I concur in OP’s calculations after that point.
Outside view: OP says <10% chance Putin would accept losing without first going nuclear, but also says, “there appears to be a widespread assumption in the West, shared by Ukrainian leaders, that Ukraine is winning and that Putin will grudgingly accept “Vietnam”.” There is no sufficient reason for OP to prefer his own analysis to that of Western and Ukrainian leaders.