We are mostly in agreement, though I don’t quite understand what you meant by:
These seem to be examples where maximizing hedonistic utility functions leads to bad things happening, because they are.
If suffering and pleasure are incommensurable, in what way are such outcomes bad?
I would also be interested in your response to the argument that suffering is inherently urgent, while pleasure does not have this quality. Imagine you are incapable of suffering, and you are currently experiencing pleasure. One could say that you would be indifferent to the pleasure being taken away from you (or being increased to a higher level). Now imagine that you are instead incapable of experiencing pleasure, and you are currently suffering. In this case it would arguably be very clear to you that reducing suffering is important.
We are mostly in agreement, though I don’t quite understand what you meant by:
If suffering and pleasure are incommensurable, in what way are such outcomes bad?
I would also be interested in your response to the argument that suffering is inherently urgent, while pleasure does not have this quality. Imagine you are incapable of suffering, and you are currently experiencing pleasure. One could say that you would be indifferent to the pleasure being taken away from you (or being increased to a higher level). Now imagine that you are instead incapable of experiencing pleasure, and you are currently suffering. In this case it would arguably be very clear to you that reducing suffering is important.