It seems they are worried they might learn more and decide they were wrong and now want something different⌠If you truly, deeply care about altruism, youâll keep picking it in every moment, up until the world changes enough that you donât.
I donât object to learning more and realizing that I value different things, but there are a lot of other reasons I might end up with different priorities or values. Some of those are not exactly epistemically virtuous.
As a concrete example, I worry that living in the SF bay area is making me care less about extreme wealth disparities. I witness them so regularly that itâs hard for me to feel the same flare of frustration that I once did. This change has felt like a gradual hedonic adaptation, rather than a thoughtful shifting of my beliefs; the phrase âvalue driftâ fits that experience well.
One solution here is, of course, not to use my emotional responses as a guide for my values (cf. Against Moral Intuitions) but emotions are a very useful decision-making shortcut and Iâd prefer not to take on the cognitive overhead of suppressing them.
As a concrete example, I worry that living in the SF bay area is making me care less about extreme wealth disparities. I witness them so regularly that itâs hard for me to feel the same flare of frustration that I once did. This change has felt like a gradual hedonic adaptation, rather than a thoughtful shifting of my beliefs; the phrase âvalue driftâ fits that experience well.
This seems to me adequately and better captured as saying the conditions of the world are different in ways that make you respond differently that you wouldnât have endorsed prior to those conditions changing. That doesnât mean your values changed, but the conditions to which you are responded changed such that your values are differently expressed; I suspect your values themselves didnât change because you say you are worried about this change in behavior youâve observed in yourself, and if your values had really changed you wouldnât be worried.
My values being differently expressed seems very important, though. If I feel as if I value the welfare of distant people, but I stop taking actions in line with that (e.g. making donations to global poverty charities), do I still value it to the same extent?
That said, my example wasnât about external behaviour changes, so you probably werenât responding with that in mind.
Iâve inarguably experienced drift in the legibility of my values to myself, since I no longer have the same emotional signal for them. I find the the term âValue Driftâ a useful shorthand for that, but it sounds like you find it makes things unclear?
My values being differently expressed seems very important, though. If I feel as if I value the welfare of distant people, but I stop taking actions in line with that (e.g. making donations to global poverty charities), do I still value it to the same extent?
Right, it sounds to me like you identify with your values in some way, like you wouldnât consider yourself to still be yourself if they were different. That confuses things because now thereâs this extra thing going on that feels causally relevant but isnât, but Iâm not sure I can hope to convince you in a short comment that you are not your values, even if your values are (temporarily) you.
I donât object to learning more and realizing that I value different things, but there are a lot of other reasons I might end up with different priorities or values. Some of those are not exactly epistemically virtuous.
As a concrete example, I worry that living in the SF bay area is making me care less about extreme wealth disparities. I witness them so regularly that itâs hard for me to feel the same flare of frustration that I once did. This change has felt like a gradual hedonic adaptation, rather than a thoughtful shifting of my beliefs; the phrase âvalue driftâ fits that experience well.
One solution here is, of course, not to use my emotional responses as a guide for my values (cf. Against Moral Intuitions) but emotions are a very useful decision-making shortcut and Iâd prefer not to take on the cognitive overhead of suppressing them.
This seems to me adequately and better captured as saying the conditions of the world are different in ways that make you respond differently that you wouldnât have endorsed prior to those conditions changing. That doesnât mean your values changed, but the conditions to which you are responded changed such that your values are differently expressed; I suspect your values themselves didnât change because you say you are worried about this change in behavior youâve observed in yourself, and if your values had really changed you wouldnât be worried.
My values being differently expressed seems very important, though. If I feel as if I value the welfare of distant people, but I stop taking actions in line with that (e.g. making donations to global poverty charities), do I still value it to the same extent?
That said, my example wasnât about external behaviour changes, so you probably werenât responding with that in mind.
Iâve inarguably experienced drift in the legibility of my values to myself, since I no longer have the same emotional signal for them. I find the the term âValue Driftâ a useful shorthand for that, but it sounds like you find it makes things unclear?
Right, it sounds to me like you identify with your values in some way, like you wouldnât consider yourself to still be yourself if they were different. That confuses things because now thereâs this extra thing going on that feels causally relevant but isnât, but Iâm not sure I can hope to convince you in a short comment that you are not your values, even if your values are (temporarily) you.