I agree there is be a non-arbitrary boundary between ācomparableā and āincomparableā that results from your framework. However, I think the empirics of some comparisons like the one above are such that we can still non-arbitrarily say that one option is better than the other for an infinite time horizon. Which empirical beliefs you hold would have to change for this to be the case? For me, the crucial consideration is whether the expected effects of actions decrease or increase over time and space. Ithink they decrease, and that one can get a sufficiently good grasp of the dominant nearterm effects to meaningfully compare actions.
Which empirical beliefs you hold would have to change for this to be the case?
For starters, weād either need:
all the factors discussed in this section to be much simpler (or otherwise structured in a way that we could model with the requisite precision); or
sufficiently strong evidence that our intuitions can implicitly weigh up such complex factors with the requisite precision.
(Sorry if this is more high-level than youāre asking for. The concrete empirical factors are elaborated in the linked section.)
Re: your claim that āexpected effects of actions decrease over time and spaceā: To me the various mechanisms for potential lock-in within our lifetimes seem not too implausible. So it seems overconfident to have a vanishingly small credence that your action makes the difference between two futures of astronomically different value. See also Mogensenās examples of mechanisms by which an AMF donation could affect extinction risk. But please let me know if thereās some nuance in the arguments of the posts you linked that Iām not addressing.
As far as I can tell, the factors you mention refer to the possibility of influencing astronomically valuable worlds. I agree locking in some properties of the world may be possible. However, even in this case, I would expect the interventions causing the lock-in to increase the probability of astronomically valuable worlds by an astronomically small amount. I think the counterfactual interventions would cause a similarly valuable lock-in slightly later, and that the difference between the factual and counterfactual expected impartial welfare would quickly tend to 0 over time, such that is is negligible after 100 years or so.
I agree there is be a non-arbitrary boundary between ācomparableā and āincomparableā that results from your framework. However, I think the empirics of some comparisons like the one above are such that we can still non-arbitrarily say that one option is better than the other for an infinite time horizon. Which empirical beliefs you hold would have to change for this to be the case? For me, the crucial consideration is whether the expected effects of actions decrease or increase over time and space. I think they decrease, and that one can get a sufficiently good grasp of the dominant nearterm effects to meaningfully compare actions.
For starters, weād either need:
all the factors discussed in this section to be much simpler (or otherwise structured in a way that we could model with the requisite precision); or
sufficiently strong evidence that our intuitions can implicitly weigh up such complex factors with the requisite precision.
(Sorry if this is more high-level than youāre asking for. The concrete empirical factors are elaborated in the linked section.)
Re: your claim that āexpected effects of actions decrease over time and spaceā: To me the various mechanisms for potential lock-in within our lifetimes seem not too implausible. So it seems overconfident to have a vanishingly small credence that your action makes the difference between two futures of astronomically different value. See also Mogensenās examples of mechanisms by which an AMF donation could affect extinction risk. But please let me know if thereās some nuance in the arguments of the posts you linked that Iām not addressing.
As far as I can tell, the factors you mention refer to the possibility of influencing astronomically valuable worlds. I agree locking in some properties of the world may be possible. However, even in this case, I would expect the interventions causing the lock-in to increase the probability of astronomically valuable worlds by an astronomically small amount. I think the counterfactual interventions would cause a similarly valuable lock-in slightly later, and that the difference between the factual and counterfactual expected impartial welfare would quickly tend to 0 over time, such that is is negligible after 100 years or so.