Imagine my UEVs for the mass of objects A and B are [0.95, 1.05] and [1, 1.1] kg. Would your framework suggest the expected mass of the objects is incomparable because my UEVs overlap in [1, 1.05] kg? I think so. However, given any 2 objects, I believe my best guess should be that the expected mass of one is smaller, equal, or larger than that of the other.
I did mean the expected mass. I have clarified this in my comment now.
What do you mean by actual mass? Possible mass? The expected mass is the mean of the possible masses weighted by their probability. I think expected masses are comparable because possible masses are comparable.
I think the term actual value is usually used to describe a possible and discrete value. However, by actual value, you mean a set of possible values, one for each of the distributions describing the mass of a single object? There has to be more than one distribution describing the mass for the expected mass not to be discrete. If that is what you mean by actual value, the actual masses of 2 objects are not necessarily comparable under your framework? If I understood correctly what you mean by actual value, and you still hold that the actual masses of 2 objects are always comparable, why would weighted sums of actual masses representing expected masses not be comparable?
I can see expected masses being incomparable in principle. It seems that gravitons are the least massive entities, and the upper bound for the mass of one is currently 1.07*10^-67 kg. So I assume we cannot currently distinguish between, for example, 10^-100 and 10^-99 kg. Yet, the expected masses of objects I can pick are practically discrete, and therefore comparable, even if I feel exactly the same about the mass of the objects. I would argue the welfare of possible futures is comparable for the same reasons.
However, by actual value, you mean a set of possible values
No, I mean just one value.
why would weighted sums of actual masses representing expected masses not be comparable?
Sorry, by āexpectedā I meant imprecise expectation, since you gave intervals in your initial comment. Imprecise expectations are incomparable for the reasons given in the post ā I worry weāre talking past each other.
I see. You are using the term actual value as it is usually used. What do you think about the 2nd paragraph of my last comment?
Iām interested in your responses to the arguments I give for the framework in this post.
The framework seems quite reasonable in principle, but I believe you are overestimating a lot the degree of imprecision (irreducible uncertainty) in practice. It looks like you are inferring the value of many possible futures is incomparable essentially because it feels very hard to compare their expected values (EVs), and therefore any choice of which one has the highest EV feels very arbitrary. In contrast, I see arbitrary choices as a reason for further research to decrease their uncertainty, and I expect this is overwhelmingly reducible. Without using any instruments, it would feel very arbitrary to pick which one of 2 identical objects with 1 and 1.001 kg is the heaviest, but this does not mean their mass is incomparable. For most practical purposes, I can assume their mass is the same. I can also use a sufficiently powerful scale in case a small difference would matter. If their mass was sufficiently close, like if it differed by only 10^-100 kg, I agree they may be incomparable, but I do not see this being relevant in practice.
To clarify, I think any actions people consider in practice are comparable, not only impact-focussed ones involving research.
On the value of research, it again looks like you are inferring the value of many possible futures is incomparable essentially because it feels very hard to compare their EVs.
I donāt know exactly what you mean by āfeels very hard to compareā. Iād appreciate more direct responses to the arguments in this post, namely, about how the comparison seems arbitrary.
I donāt know exactly what you mean by āfeels very hard to compareā.
It looks like you are inferring incomparability between the value of 2 futures (non-discrete overlap between their UEVs) from the subjective feeling (in your mind) that their EVs feel very hard to compare (given all the evidence you considered), as any comparisons involve decisive arbitrary assumptions. I mean āarbitraryā as used in common language.
Iād appreciate more direct responses to the arguments in this post, namely, about how the comparison seems arbitrary.
Comparisons among the expected cost-effectiveness of the vast majority of interventions seem arbitrary to me too due to effects on soil animals and microorganisms. However, the same goes for comparisons among the expected mass of seemingly identical objects with a similar mass if I can only assess their mass using my hands, but this does not mean their mass is incomparable. To assess this, we have to empirically determine which fraction of the uncertainty in their mass is irreducible. 10 k years ago, it would not have been possible to determine which of 2 rocks with around 1 kg was the heaviest if their mass only differed by 10^-6 kg. Yet, this is possible today. Some semi-micro balances have a resolution of 0.01 mg, 10^-8 kg. So I would say the expected mass of the rocks was comparable 10 k years ago. Do you agree? There could be some irreducible uncertainty in the mass of the rocks, but much less than suggested by the evidence available 10 k years ago.
You are welcome to return to this later. I would be curious to know your thoughts.
EV is subjective. Iād recommend this post for more on this.
I liked the post. I agree EV is subjective to some extent. The same goes for the concept of mass, which depends on our imperfect understanding of physics. However, the expected mass of objects is still comparable, unless there is only an infinitesimal difference between their mass.
Imagine my UEVs for the mass of objects A and B are [0.95, 1.05] and [1, 1.1] kg. Would your framework suggest the expected mass of the objects is incomparable because my UEVs overlap in [1, 1.05] kg? I think so. However, given any 2 objects, I believe my best guess should be that the expected mass of one is smaller, equal, or larger than that of the other.
Yes, for the expected mass.
Why? (The actual mass must be either smaller, equal, or larger, but I donāt see why that should imply that the expected mass is.)
I did mean the expected mass. I have clarified this in my comment now.
What do you mean by actual mass? Possible mass? The expected mass is the mean of the possible masses weighted by their probability. I think expected masses are comparable because possible masses are comparable.
The mass that the object in fact has. :) Sorry, not sure I understand the confusion.
I donāt think this follows. Iām interested in your responses to the arguments I give for the framework in this post.
I think the term actual value is usually used to describe a possible and discrete value. However, by actual value, you mean a set of possible values, one for each of the distributions describing the mass of a single object? There has to be more than one distribution describing the mass for the expected mass not to be discrete. If that is what you mean by actual value, the actual masses of 2 objects are not necessarily comparable under your framework? If I understood correctly what you mean by actual value, and you still hold that the actual masses of 2 objects are always comparable, why would weighted sums of actual masses representing expected masses not be comparable?
I can see expected masses being incomparable in principle. It seems that gravitons are the least massive entities, and the upper bound for the mass of one is currently 1.07*10^-67 kg. So I assume we cannot currently distinguish between, for example, 10^-100 and 10^-99 kg. Yet, the expected masses of objects I can pick are practically discrete, and therefore comparable, even if I feel exactly the same about the mass of the objects. I would argue the welfare of possible futures is comparable for the same reasons.
No, I mean just one value.
Sorry, by āexpectedā I meant imprecise expectation, since you gave intervals in your initial comment. Imprecise expectations are incomparable for the reasons given in the post ā I worry weāre talking past each other.
I see. You are using the term actual value as it is usually used. What do you think about the 2nd paragraph of my last comment?
The framework seems quite reasonable in principle, but I believe you are overestimating a lot the degree of imprecision (irreducible uncertainty) in practice. It looks like you are inferring the value of many possible futures is incomparable essentially because it feels very hard to compare their expected values (EVs), and therefore any choice of which one has the highest EV feels very arbitrary. In contrast, I see arbitrary choices as a reason for further research to decrease their uncertainty, and I expect this is overwhelmingly reducible. Without using any instruments, it would feel very arbitrary to pick which one of 2 identical objects with 1 and 1.001 kg is the heaviest, but this does not mean their mass is incomparable. For most practical purposes, I can assume their mass is the same. I can also use a sufficiently powerful scale in case a small difference would matter. If their mass was sufficiently close, like if it differed by only 10^-100 kg, I agree they may be incomparable, but I do not see this being relevant in practice.
First, itās already very big-if-true if all EA intervention candidates other than ādo more researchā are incomparable with inaction.
Second, ādo more researchā is itself an action whose sign seems intractably sensitive to things weāre unaware of. I discuss this here.
To clarify, I think any actions people consider in practice are comparable, not only impact-focussed ones involving research.
On the value of research, it again looks like you are inferring the value of many possible futures is incomparable essentially because it feels very hard to compare their EVs.
I donāt know exactly what you mean by āfeels very hard to compareā. Iād appreciate more direct responses to the arguments in this post, namely, about how the comparison seems arbitrary.
It looks like you are inferring incomparability between the value of 2 futures (non-discrete overlap between their UEVs) from the subjective feeling (in your mind) that their EVs feel very hard to compare (given all the evidence you considered), as any comparisons involve decisive arbitrary assumptions. I mean āarbitraryā as used in common language.
Comparisons among the expected cost-effectiveness of the vast majority of interventions seem arbitrary to me too due to effects on soil animals and microorganisms. However, the same goes for comparisons among the expected mass of seemingly identical objects with a similar mass if I can only assess their mass using my hands, but this does not mean their mass is incomparable. To assess this, we have to empirically determine which fraction of the uncertainty in their mass is irreducible. 10 k years ago, it would not have been possible to determine which of 2 rocks with around 1 kg was the heaviest if their mass only differed by 10^-6 kg. Yet, this is possible today. Some semi-micro balances have a resolution of 0.01 mg, 10^-8 kg. So I would say the expected mass of the rocks was comparable 10 k years ago. Do you agree? There could be some irreducible uncertainty in the mass of the rocks, but much less than suggested by the evidence available 10 k years ago.
(Sorry, due to lack of time I donāt expect Iāll reply further. But thank you for the discussion! A quick note:)
EV is subjective. Iād recommend this post for more on this.
You are welcome to return to this later. I would be curious to know your thoughts.
I liked the post. I agree EV is subjective to some extent. The same goes for the concept of mass, which depends on our imperfect understanding of physics. However, the expected mass of objects is still comparable, unless there is only an infinitesimal difference between their mass.