I wonder if it might be helpful to modify your claim (i) to be more similar to Hilary’s definition by referring to intrinsic value rather than mattering morally. Eg. Something like:
(i) Lives situated in the future have just as much intrinsic value as lives situated in the present
I think that wording could be improved but to me it seems like it does a better job of conveying:
“For any populations of people p, and any permutation with respect to time of that population that keeps the wellbeing levels of all individuals the same, p’, p and p’ are equally good.”
As well as making allowance for special relationships and personal prerogatives, this also allows for the idea that the current generation holds some additional instrumental value (in enabling/affecting future generations) in addition to our intrinsic value. To me this instrumental value would have some impact on the extent to which people matter morally.
I think if you acknowledge that current populations may have some greater value (eg by virtue of instrumental value) then you would need to make claim (ii) stronger, eg. “society currently over-privileges those who live today above those who will live in the future”.
I appreciate that “matter just as much, morally” is a stronger statement (and perhaps carries some important meaning in philosophy of which I’m ignorant?). I think it also sounds nicer, which seems important for an idea that you want to have broad appeal. But perhaps its ambiguity (as I perceive it) leaves it more open to objections.
Also, FWIW I disagree with the idea that (i) could be replaced with “Those who live at future times matter morally”. It doesn’t seem strong enough and I don’t think (iii) would flow from that and (ii) as it is. So I think if you did change to this weaker version of (i) it would be even more important to make (ii) stronger.
I wonder if it might be helpful to modify your claim (i) to be more similar to Hilary’s definition by referring to intrinsic value rather than mattering morally. Eg. Something like:
(i) Lives situated in the future have just as much intrinsic value as lives situated in the present
I think that wording could be improved but to me it seems like it does a better job of conveying:
“For any populations of people p, and any permutation with respect to time of that population that keeps the wellbeing levels of all individuals the same, p’, p and p’ are equally good.”
As well as making allowance for special relationships and personal prerogatives, this also allows for the idea that the current generation holds some additional instrumental value (in enabling/affecting future generations) in addition to our intrinsic value. To me this instrumental value would have some impact on the extent to which people matter morally.
I think if you acknowledge that current populations may have some greater value (eg by virtue of instrumental value) then you would need to make claim (ii) stronger, eg. “society currently over-privileges those who live today above those who will live in the future”.
I appreciate that “matter just as much, morally” is a stronger statement (and perhaps carries some important meaning in philosophy of which I’m ignorant?). I think it also sounds nicer, which seems important for an idea that you want to have broad appeal. But perhaps its ambiguity (as I perceive it) leaves it more open to objections.
Also, FWIW I disagree with the idea that (i) could be replaced with “Those who live at future times matter morally”. It doesn’t seem strong enough and I don’t think (iii) would flow from that and (ii) as it is. So I think if you did change to this weaker version of (i) it would be even more important to make (ii) stronger.