An alternative minimal definition [...] the (intrinsic) value of an outcome is the same no matter what time it occurs.
Why doesn’t this do the job, if combined with the premise that we should maximize social welfare? I like to think in terms of a social planner maximizing welfare over all future generations. By assuming that value doesn’t depend on time, we rule out pure time preference and thereby treat all generations equally. And maximizing social welfare gets us to stop privileging current generations (eg, by investing in reducing extinction risk at the expense of current consumption).
So I’d say: longtermism =df maximizing social welfare with no pure time preference.
The only reason I don’t identify as longtermist is tractability. I would appreciate a definition that allowed me to affirm that when a being occurs in time is morally arbitrary without also committing me to focusing my efforts on the long-term.
Why doesn’t this do the job, if combined with the premise that we should maximize social welfare? I like to think in terms of a social planner maximizing welfare over all future generations. By assuming that value doesn’t depend on time, we rule out pure time preference and thereby treat all generations equally. And maximizing social welfare gets us to stop privileging current generations (eg, by investing in reducing extinction risk at the expense of current consumption).
So I’d say: longtermism =df maximizing social welfare with no pure time preference.
The only reason I don’t identify as longtermist is tractability. I would appreciate a definition that allowed me to affirm that when a being occurs in time is morally arbitrary without also committing me to focusing my efforts on the long-term.
Yes, it’s a bit question-begging to assert that the actions with the highest marginal utility per dollar are those targeting long-term outcomes.
This definition avoids issues with being falsified by empirical questions of tractability, as well as flip-flopping between short- and longtermism.