1. They take total utilitarian axiology and EV maximization for granted in their main arguments:
Our discussion above was conducted on the assumption of (i) a total utilitarian axiology and (ii) an expected-value approach to ex ante evaluation under uncertainty. Both of these assumptions are at least somewhat controversial.
(I think “at least somewhat controversial” is an understatement, although true.)
2. Whenever they refer to views being “plausible” or not, that’s according to their own subjective weighting.
They take total utilitarian axiology and EV maximization for granted in their main arguments
I think this is a very misleading characterization of the paper. The passage you quoted is part of a paragraph which reads as follows (emphasis added):
Our discussion above was conducted on the assumption of (i) a total utilitarian axiology and (ii) an expected-value approach to ex ante evaluation under uncertainty. Both of these assumptions are at least somewhat controversial. The present section examines the extent to which our arguments would be undermined by various ways of deviating from those assumptions. Broadly, the upshot will be that the case for strong longtermism is quite robust to plausible deviations from these starting axiological and decision-theoretic assumptions.
Moreover, this is not a claim incidental to the paper; it is one of the paper’s central claims. As the authors write in the introductory section:
Our aim in this paper is to expand on this prior work in four ways… Second, we show that the argument goes through on a wide range of axiologies and decision theories, not only on the combination of total utilitarianism and expected utility theory.
In other words, one of the four key arguments made in the paper is that the case for axiological strong longtermism does not require the acceptance of a total utilitarian axiology or expected utility theory.
Ah, my bad, thanks for the correction. I guess “initial argument” would have been a better characterization than “main argument”. I wanted to highlight the section “Axiological and decision-theoretic objections” since it covers some of the same points as the OP.
See also Greaves and MacAskill’s “The Case for Strong Longtermism” (work in progress, and linked to here), especially section 4. “Axiological and decision-theoretic objections”, which covers and responds to some of the same objections.
A few remarks:
1. They take total utilitarian axiology and EV maximization for granted in their main arguments:
(I think “at least somewhat controversial” is an understatement, although true.)
2. Whenever they refer to views being “plausible” or not, that’s according to their own subjective weighting.
I think this is a very misleading characterization of the paper. The passage you quoted is part of a paragraph which reads as follows (emphasis added):
Moreover, this is not a claim incidental to the paper; it is one of the paper’s central claims. As the authors write in the introductory section:
In other words, one of the four key arguments made in the paper is that the case for axiological strong longtermism does not require the acceptance of a total utilitarian axiology or expected utility theory.
Ah, my bad, thanks for the correction. I guess “initial argument” would have been a better characterization than “main argument”. I wanted to highlight the section “Axiological and decision-theoretic objections” since it covers some of the same points as the OP.