Is this kind of replaceability compatible with current practices in Longtermism?
What is the consequence of the claim that if I fail to take an action to preserve Future People, Other Future People likely replace them?
Let’s say I give money to MIRI instead of saving current people, based on some calculations of future people I might save. Are we discounting those Future People by the Other Future People? Why don’t we value Other Future People just as much as Future People? Of course we do.
Perhaps that is the point of this thought experiment. Perhaps “of course you don’t pull the switch” is the only right answer precisely because of replaceability.
Is this kind of replaceability compatible with current practices in Longtermism?
What is the consequence of the claim that if I fail to take an action to preserve Future People, Other Future People likely replace them?
Let’s say I give money to MIRI instead of saving current people, based on some calculations of future people I might save. Are we discounting those Future People by the Other Future People? Why don’t we value Other Future People just as much as Future People? Of course we do.
Perhaps that is the point of this thought experiment. Perhaps “of course you don’t pull the switch” is the only right answer precisely because of replaceability.