Thanks for this. I think the dialectical situation is a bit uncertain. Here’s how I see it. The empirical premise seems to be solid. The conceptual premise, I think, is analytic. So if there’s a problem with the argument, it’s in the normative premise. My post tries to say where that problem is.
An analogy to explain why I think it’s relevant: Imagine you have some people who want to take a train to Destination. It’s a coal-powered train. They discover it won’t get them there. Someone says: Hey, the problem is the coal-power doesn’t work. And here’s why. Use another kind of propulsion (magnets, maybe).” I take your comment to be: “but that’s irrelevant: they want to use the coal-powered train.” I think my (Rolling Stones-inspried) reply is: but if they just care about taking the train to the destination, they can’t get what they want, but they can get what they need.”
Another analogy with a potted (semi-fictional) history of science: Pre-Einstein, some physicists wanted to figure out the reference frame for absolute motion. They wanted to be able to say, for example, whether trains really were in motion, not just whether they were in motion relative to other things. They tried various theories of aether to do this. Then Einstein shows those theories can’t work, and he gives a way to preserve objectivity about motion (via invariants) without absolutism about motion. If a peer were to have said to him “but that’s irrelevant, we care about absolute motion,” his reply should be “sure, but that concern is misplaced, and here’s an invitation to reframe what you care about—objectivity of motion—as about invariants rather than absolutes.”
(Making the analogy explicit: EAs care about impartial altruistic action in terms of overall consequences. Giovanni’s sequence tries to show they can’t have that. My post is that the reason they can’t have it is the overall consequences part, not the impartial altruistic part. And the suggestion is that even if they can’t get what they want (impartial altruistic action in terms of overall consequences), maybe they can get what they need (impartial altruistic action in some other terms, depending on an analysis of impartiality).
Also, because the internet doesn’t convey tone: I used trains in the examples here because I very much enjoyed your story about ArbitraryLand.
Thanks for this. I think the dialectical situation is a bit uncertain. Here’s how I see it. The empirical premise seems to be solid. The conceptual premise, I think, is analytic. So if there’s a problem with the argument, it’s in the normative premise. My post tries to say where that problem is.
An analogy to explain why I think it’s relevant: Imagine you have some people who want to take a train to Destination. It’s a coal-powered train. They discover it won’t get them there. Someone says: Hey, the problem is the coal-power doesn’t work. And here’s why. Use another kind of propulsion (magnets, maybe).” I take your comment to be: “but that’s irrelevant: they want to use the coal-powered train.” I think my (Rolling Stones-inspried) reply is: but if they just care about taking the train to the destination, they can’t get what they want, but they can get what they need.”
Another analogy with a potted (semi-fictional) history of science: Pre-Einstein, some physicists wanted to figure out the reference frame for absolute motion. They wanted to be able to say, for example, whether trains really were in motion, not just whether they were in motion relative to other things. They tried various theories of aether to do this. Then Einstein shows those theories can’t work, and he gives a way to preserve objectivity about motion (via invariants) without absolutism about motion. If a peer were to have said to him “but that’s irrelevant, we care about absolute motion,” his reply should be “sure, but that concern is misplaced, and here’s an invitation to reframe what you care about—objectivity of motion—as about invariants rather than absolutes.”
(Making the analogy explicit: EAs care about impartial altruistic action in terms of overall consequences. Giovanni’s sequence tries to show they can’t have that. My post is that the reason they can’t have it is the overall consequences part, not the impartial altruistic part. And the suggestion is that even if they can’t get what they want (impartial altruistic action in terms of overall consequences), maybe they can get what they need (impartial altruistic action in some other terms, depending on an analysis of impartiality).
Also, because the internet doesn’t convey tone: I used trains in the examples here because I very much enjoyed your story about ArbitraryLand.