Hi Impartial, thanks for this reply! Canât speak for Jesse, but I definitely agree with this:
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that overall indeterminacy is not to be avoided tout court. We should avoid it where, and only where, it does not actually obtain from an impartial altruistic point of view.
So, if bracketing (either TD or BU) is entirely non-action-guiding for the reasons Jesse mentions, that doesnât bear on whether bracketing is a good normative theory. But it does bear on your claim at the start of your post: âBottom-up, person-centered bracketing can thus preserve principled impartial action guidanceâ.
Hi againââthanks! Yes, I should have been more precise about what the claim is Iâm trying to argue: that person-centered bottom-up bracketing provides action guiding (determinate) verdicts in just those cases, whether hypothetical or actual, where altruistic action guidance plausibly obtains, and outputs indeterminacy in the other cases. In other words, the claim is that there are no normatively problematic failures of action guidance.
Hi Impartial, thanks for this reply! Canât speak for Jesse, but I definitely agree with this:
So, if bracketing (either TD or BU) is entirely non-action-guiding for the reasons Jesse mentions, that doesnât bear on whether bracketing is a good normative theory. But it does bear on your claim at the start of your post: âBottom-up, person-centered bracketing can thus preserve principled impartial action guidanceâ.
Hi againââthanks! Yes, I should have been more precise about what the claim is Iâm trying to argue: that person-centered bottom-up bracketing provides action guiding (determinate) verdicts in just those cases, whether hypothetical or actual, where altruistic action guidance plausibly obtains, and outputs indeterminacy in the other cases. In other words, the claim is that there are no normatively problematic failures of action guidance.