Is this a version of (weak) actualism as a person-affecting theory? In worlds where Alice doesnât exist, she has no properties like welfare to provide us any reasons or welfare-based objections.
Weak actualism, as in the literature (Hare, 2007, Spencer, 2021 section 6), would say to pick among the options that maximize âself-conditional valueâ. An option is permissible only if itâs no worse than any other for the people who (ever) exist in the resulting outcome. In other words, assuming we choose the option A, we compare all the options pairwise on the basis of the reasons provided by the people who would exist given our choice of A,[1] and if A is no worse overall than any other option on these comparisons, then it maximizes self-conditional value.[2]
It sounds similar to what you wrote here, too:
Perhaps, on a person-centered approach to ethics, that is simply true (cf. Boonin 2014 and Pummer 2024): If we choose B, we will have made it the case that (i) no actual person has negative welfare, which they could object to on personal welfare grounds, and (ii) all actual persons have the maximum amount of positive welfare they could have had. (Person p2, once she exists, will have no welfare-based objection to our choosing B: We could not have made her better off. Nor will p1, who will not exist.) On a person-centered approach, we may therefore have maximized peopleâs welfare in the sense that matters.
I also think maximizing self-conditional value as formalized in the literature is the wrong approach for an actualist when deciding between at least 3 options, because itâs myopic, and we should use backward induction on behalf of the people who would exist given an option. This can avoid the repugnant conclusion. I have an unpublished draft based on the idea of backward induction for weak actualism Iâd be happy to share, and I discuss the problem a bit here.
Thanks, Michaelâbriefly for now (Iâm short on time today and this week): I think some actualist views deserve to be taken very seriously, but for the purpose of defending person-centered bottom-up bracketing, I meant to leave open what procreative reasons are supplied by the persons we can bring into existence. E.g., while the framing of welfare-based objections/âregrets suggests an asymmetric view (focused on preventing miserable lives), antiobjections/âgratitudes might give us reasons too (to bring happy lives into existence, or to grant them permitting/âjustifying/âcanceling force). I agree myopia is an issue but think avoiding it is doable. Iâd be interested in reading your draft.
Is this a version of (weak) actualism as a person-affecting theory? In worlds where Alice doesnât exist, she has no properties like welfare to provide us any reasons or welfare-based objections.
Weak actualism, as in the literature (Hare, 2007, Spencer, 2021 section 6), would say to pick among the options that maximize âself-conditional valueâ. An option is permissible only if itâs no worse than any other for the people who (ever) exist in the resulting outcome. In other words, assuming we choose the option A, we compare all the options pairwise on the basis of the reasons provided by the people who would exist given our choice of A,[1] and if A is no worse overall than any other option on these comparisons, then it maximizes self-conditional value.[2]
It sounds similar to what you wrote here, too:
Weighing the reasons by the probability that those reasons exist at all, say.
Weak actualism doesnât need to say that all options that maximize self-conditional value are permissible. There are some cases where we can plausibly recommend choices between them.
I also think maximizing self-conditional value as formalized in the literature is the wrong approach for an actualist when deciding between at least 3 options, because itâs myopic, and we should use backward induction on behalf of the people who would exist given an option. This can avoid the repugnant conclusion. I have an unpublished draft based on the idea of backward induction for weak actualism Iâd be happy to share, and I discuss the problem a bit here.
Thanks, Michaelâbriefly for now (Iâm short on time today and this week): I think some actualist views deserve to be taken very seriously, but for the purpose of defending person-centered bottom-up bracketing, I meant to leave open what procreative reasons are supplied by the persons we can bring into existence. E.g., while the framing of welfare-based objections/âregrets suggests an asymmetric view (focused on preventing miserable lives), antiobjections/âgratitudes might give us reasons too (to bring happy lives into existence, or to grant them permitting/âjustifying/âcanceling force). I agree myopia is an issue but think avoiding it is doable. Iâd be interested in reading your draft.
Hereâs the draft!