Hi both, thanks––yes, I agree this might justify Toby’s intuition: Person-moments, or “points of view” that a person occupies (cf. Pettigrew’s lecture 6 here), might be the appropriate basic objects of moral concern. I am sympathetic to some of the arguments for this view (e.g., drawing on the apparent existence of intrapersonal moral demands). It might also help us avoid the cluelessness problem potentially posed by prudential longtermism: Take the snack now, bracket your far future “selves.”
So my response is this: I think we should first try and see how far we can get with persons as the basic objects of altruistic concern, for a variety of reasons. But feel free to insert “person-moment” or “point of view occupied by a person” where my post says “person”; you’ll get person-moment-centered bottom-up bracketing, or personal-point-of-view-centered bottom-up bracketing, based on exactly parallel arguments. Importantly, the shift to person-moments or points of view does not render the theory “impersonal” or “aggregate-first.” It just makes the individual, separate persons we are concerned with smaller.
feel free to insert “person-moment” or “point of view occupied by a person” where my post says “person”; you’ll get person-moment-centered bottom-up bracketing, or personal-point-of-view-centered bottom-up bracketing, based on exactly parallel arguments.
I’ve actually been confused about why Kollin et al. (2025) and Clifton (2025) never even mentioned something like “person-moments” as potential “locations of value”. After a quick look, it seems they’ve been considered in infinite ethics, and I didn’t find any argument for why they’re clearly not suited as serious candidates.
Maybe any way of individuating person-moments was considered too arbitrary, or there’s some reason, that does not come to mind rn, why bracketing over those would fail to provide action guidance?
there’s some reason, that does not come to mind rn, why bracketing over those would fail to provide action guidance?
The worry is very similar to the worry about bracketing on persons: identity of person-moments is super fragile.
Let’s say I donate to AMF. There are some far-future person-moments for which I am clueful that donating to AMF seriously harms them, because these person-moments only exist in the possible worlds corresponding to [insert far-future backfire risk here]. And we can say the same substituting in “benefits” for “harms”. We then end up a maximal bracket-set on which the donation is good, and one on which the donation is bad.
(If this needs more unpacking, I’m happy to do that!)
When you suppose here that consequentialist bracketing implies neartermism, are you conditioning on space-time region bracketing? (Which is arguably more action-guiding than any form of person-based bracketing?)
Hi Anthony, thanks––unpacking the worry and making it precise would be helpful, yes (especially as it applies to bottom-up bracketing). Perhaps my discussion with Michael can help locate potential disagreements. I just added a few thoughts.
Hi both, thanks––yes, I agree this might justify Toby’s intuition: Person-moments, or “points of view” that a person occupies (cf. Pettigrew’s lecture 6 here), might be the appropriate basic objects of moral concern. I am sympathetic to some of the arguments for this view (e.g., drawing on the apparent existence of intrapersonal moral demands). It might also help us avoid the cluelessness problem potentially posed by prudential longtermism: Take the snack now, bracket your far future “selves.”
So my response is this: I think we should first try and see how far we can get with persons as the basic objects of altruistic concern, for a variety of reasons. But feel free to insert “person-moment” or “point of view occupied by a person” where my post says “person”; you’ll get person-moment-centered bottom-up bracketing, or personal-point-of-view-centered bottom-up bracketing, based on exactly parallel arguments. Importantly, the shift to person-moments or points of view does not render the theory “impersonal” or “aggregate-first.” It just makes the individual, separate persons we are concerned with smaller.
I’ve actually been confused about why Kollin et al. (2025) and Clifton (2025) never even mentioned something like “person-moments” as potential “locations of value”. After a quick look, it seems they’ve been considered in infinite ethics, and I didn’t find any argument for why they’re clearly not suited as serious candidates.
Maybe any way of individuating person-moments was considered too arbitrary, or there’s some reason, that does not come to mind rn, why bracketing over those would fail to provide action guidance?
The worry is very similar to the worry about bracketing on persons: identity of person-moments is super fragile.
Let’s say I donate to AMF. There are some far-future person-moments for which I am clueful that donating to AMF seriously harms them, because these person-moments only exist in the possible worlds corresponding to [insert far-future backfire risk here]. And we can say the same substituting in “benefits” for “harms”. We then end up a maximal bracket-set on which the donation is good, and one on which the donation is bad.
(If this needs more unpacking, I’m happy to do that!)
When you suppose here that consequentialist bracketing implies neartermism, are you conditioning on space-time region bracketing? (Which is arguably more action-guiding than any form of person-based bracketing?)
Yeah, spacetime bracketing or some more formally nebulous form of bracketing along the lines here.
Hi Anthony, thanks––unpacking the worry and making it precise would be helpful, yes (especially as it applies to bottom-up bracketing). Perhaps my discussion with Michael can help locate potential disagreements. I just added a few thoughts.