Nobody would deny that 2 people living in bliss is a worse state than 1bi in nirvana
Adepts of total hedonic utilitarians (e.g. me) would support this, as long as bliss is sufficiently better than nirvana. I it easy to see (if not feel) that 10^9 is much larger than 2, but “bliss” and “nirvana” look similar because they are somewhat vague.
Besides my mentioning of uncertainty above, I also guess (very tentatively) that some other factors might mess up with our intuitions
I agree the factors you mention also explain why the RC is often seen as repugnant. That being said, would you say they are evidence against the total view?
Something that puzzles me is that RC seems to be analogous to the problem of fanaticism in Pascalian scenarios—and yet I don’t see this analogy being widely explored.
I think it is a little bit different. If someone asks me for 100 T$ (similar to global GDP) in return for 1 $, I am happy with rejecting the offer because the variance of my prior is much lower than that of the offer. In the RC, which is just a tought experiment, I think we are supposed to consider that both scenarios (e.g. 2 people in bliss, and 1 G in nirvana) are certain (i.e. have null variance), so bayesian considerations should arguably not play a role.
Thanks for this reply, meu caro. My remarks: 1. Though “bliss” and (tranquil) “nirvana” are vague, and some people might equate them, in the text being discussed they are made a bit more precisified… But I guess we both agree that it is still far away from making them precise terms—especially because we are not very good at measuring welfare. I consider this as evidence that uncertainty plays a role in our “repugnant” intuitions.
2. Allow me to be brief and tentative: I don’t consider my remarks as evidence against the total view. I suspect the total view is the right theory of value / good (though I distinguish this from a theory of justice / duty—which is another way of answering “what should we do?”). I think that RC reasoning is probably correct—but it is hard to apply in uncertain comparison, or might be quite trivial (and so not very “repugnant”) in certain ones.
3. I agree that RC reasoning does not involve uncertainty / risk / probabilities. But I find the premises and its steps quite reminiscent of some “low probability—high expectancy” cases—so that I suspect the formal arguments are related (besides the fact that both conclusions seem to be entailed by expected utility theory). When I do have the time to engage with the literature, I’ll start with Nebel’s Intrapersonal Addition Paradox, and Kosonen’s solution.
Adepts of total hedonic utilitarians (e.g. me) would support this, as long as bliss is sufficiently better than nirvana. I it easy to see (if not feel) that 10^9 is much larger than 2, but “bliss” and “nirvana” look similar because they are somewhat vague.
I agree the factors you mention also explain why the RC is often seen as repugnant. That being said, would you say they are evidence against the total view?
I think it is a little bit different. If someone asks me for 100 T$ (similar to global GDP) in return for 1 $, I am happy with rejecting the offer because the variance of my prior is much lower than that of the offer. In the RC, which is just a tought experiment, I think we are supposed to consider that both scenarios (e.g. 2 people in bliss, and 1 G in nirvana) are certain (i.e. have null variance), so bayesian considerations should arguably not play a role.
Thanks for this reply, meu caro. My remarks:
1. Though “bliss” and (tranquil) “nirvana” are vague, and some people might equate them, in the text being discussed they are made a bit more precisified… But I guess we both agree that it is still far away from making them precise terms—especially because we are not very good at measuring welfare. I consider this as evidence that uncertainty plays a role in our “repugnant” intuitions.
2. Allow me to be brief and tentative: I don’t consider my remarks as evidence against the total view. I suspect the total view is the right theory of value / good (though I distinguish this from a theory of justice / duty—which is another way of answering “what should we do?”). I think that RC reasoning is probably correct—but it is hard to apply in uncertain comparison, or might be quite trivial (and so not very “repugnant”) in certain ones.
3. I agree that RC reasoning does not involve uncertainty / risk / probabilities. But I find the premises and its steps quite reminiscent of some “low probability—high expectancy” cases—so that I suspect the formal arguments are related (besides the fact that both conclusions seem to be entailed by expected utility theory). When I do have the time to engage with the literature, I’ll start with Nebel’s Intrapersonal Addition Paradox, and Kosonen’s solution.
Thanks for clarifying!