I don’t think this is right. We could imagine a very simple creature experience very little pain but be totally focused on it. It’s true that normally for creatures like us, we tend to focus more on more intense pain, but this doesn’t mean that’s the relevant benchmark for intensity. My claim is the causal arrow goes the other way.
But if I did, I think this would make me think animal consciousness is even more serious. For simple creatures, pain takes up their whole world.
Maybe it’ll help for me to rephrase: if a being has more things it can attend to (be aware of, have in its attention) simultaneously, then it has more attention to pull. It can attend to more, all else equal, for example, if it has a richer/more detailed visual field, similar to more pixels in a computer screen.
We could imagine a very simple creature experience very little pain but be totally focused on it.
If it’s very simple, it would probably have very little attention to pull (relatively), so the pain would not be intense under the hypothesis I’m putting forward.
But if I did, I think this would make me think animal consciousness is even more serious. For simple creatures, pain takes up their whole world.
I also give some weight to this possibility, i.e. that we should measure attention in individual-relative terms, and it’s something more like the proportion of attention pulled that matters.
EDIT: And, as you may have had in mind, this seems more consistent with Welfare Footprint Project’s definitions of pain intensity, assuming annoying pain falls in the same intensity range across animals, hurtful in the same range across animals, disabling in the same range across animals and excruciating in the same range across animals.
I don’t think this is right. We could imagine a very simple creature experience very little pain but be totally focused on it. It’s true that normally for creatures like us, we tend to focus more on more intense pain, but this doesn’t mean that’s the relevant benchmark for intensity. My claim is the causal arrow goes the other way.
But if I did, I think this would make me think animal consciousness is even more serious. For simple creatures, pain takes up their whole world.
Maybe it’ll help for me to rephrase: if a being has more things it can attend to (be aware of, have in its attention) simultaneously, then it has more attention to pull. It can attend to more, all else equal, for example, if it has a richer/more detailed visual field, similar to more pixels in a computer screen.
If it’s very simple, it would probably have very little attention to pull (relatively), so the pain would not be intense under the hypothesis I’m putting forward.
I also give some weight to this possibility, i.e. that we should measure attention in individual-relative terms, and it’s something more like the proportion of attention pulled that matters.
EDIT: And, as you may have had in mind, this seems more consistent with Welfare Footprint Project’s definitions of pain intensity, assuming annoying pain falls in the same intensity range across animals, hurtful in the same range across animals, disabling in the same range across animals and excruciating in the same range across animals.