(1) Ukraine’s inability to join NATO so long as it has outstanding territorial disputes, and hence its susceptibility to future invasions and war crimes.
I should have mentioned this, but it will only have an outstanding territorial dispute if it continues to claim sovereignty over Crimea, not if it makes a deal as described in the end section.
(2) Russia’s continued possession of Sevastopol and Crimea allowing it to threaten Black Sea shipping, blockade grain exports, and cause/threaten to cause global famine as political leverage as happened early last year.
To some extent this falls under the topic of weakening Russia. But making a peace deal with Russia would just as quickly solve this risk as taking Crimea, making this a reason to especially prioritize shortening the war. I didn’t mention it because it’s currently solved with a deal to allow the exports, and it presumably won’t be a problem in peacetime.
I should have mentioned this, but it will only have an outstanding territorial dispute if it continues to claim sovereignty over Crimea, not if it makes a deal as described in the end section.
To some extent this falls under the topic of weakening Russia. But making a peace deal with Russia would just as quickly solve this risk as taking Crimea, making this a reason to especially prioritize shortening the war. I didn’t mention it because it’s currently solved with a deal to allow the exports, and it presumably won’t be a problem in peacetime.