But for this kind of bargain to work, wouldn’t you need confidence that the you in other worlds would uphold their end of the bargain?
E.g., if it looks like I’m in videogame-world, it’s probably pretty easy to spend lots of time playing videogames. But can I be confident that my counterpart in altruism-world will actually allocate enough of their time towards altruism?
(Note I don’t know anything about Nash bargains and only read the non-maths parts of this post, so let me know if this is a basic misunderstanding!)
Great question—you absolutely need to take that into account! You can only bargain with people who you expect to uphold the bargain. This probably means that when you’re bargaining, you should weight “you in other worlds” in proportion to how likely they are to uphold the bargain. This seems really hard to think about and probably ties in with a bunch of complicated questions around decision theory.
Interesting to think about!
But for this kind of bargain to work, wouldn’t you need confidence that the you in other worlds would uphold their end of the bargain?
E.g., if it looks like I’m in videogame-world, it’s probably pretty easy to spend lots of time playing videogames. But can I be confident that my counterpart in altruism-world will actually allocate enough of their time towards altruism?
(Note I don’t know anything about Nash bargains and only read the non-maths parts of this post, so let me know if this is a basic misunderstanding!)
Great question—you absolutely need to take that into account! You can only bargain with people who you expect to uphold the bargain. This probably means that when you’re bargaining, you should weight “you in other worlds” in proportion to how likely they are to uphold the bargain. This seems really hard to think about and probably ties in with a bunch of complicated questions around decision theory.