Thanks for the good post. I’m reminded of a paper by the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson that you might find interesting . It’s about how epistemic injustice (harm or unfairness done to a person in their capacity as a source of knowledge) is not just a transactional phenomenon between individuals, but is instantiated in social structures too. And responses to these injustices may need to be structural. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211
The particular relevance to EAs might be that while each member may be epistemically virtuous (e.g. not allowing ethnic or racial biases to affect their judgments of others’ claims), particular structures might still be objectionable. There’s another paper (that I thought was by Anderson, but can’t find!) that talks about the epistemic benefits of getting diverse input.
[Edit: Also, just because I’m currently reading it and it is somewhat relevant, it’s worth noting Hans Rosling’s broad summary of changes in the global population distribution: currently there is 1 billion people in Europe, 1 billion in the Americas, 1 billion in Africa, and 4 billion in Asia. In 2100, it is predicted that there will still be 1 billion in Europe and 1 billion in the Americas, but 4 billion in Africa and 5 billion in Asia.]
Unfortunately the paper is behind a paywall and I’m not a student. And while it might be fine from an individual morality basis to pay for philosophy papers I object to the academic journal system that requires it, so I can’t in good conscience shell out $45 to read it ;)
Thanks for the good post. I’m reminded of a paper by the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson that you might find interesting . It’s about how epistemic injustice (harm or unfairness done to a person in their capacity as a source of knowledge) is not just a transactional phenomenon between individuals, but is instantiated in social structures too. And responses to these injustices may need to be structural. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211
The particular relevance to EAs might be that while each member may be epistemically virtuous (e.g. not allowing ethnic or racial biases to affect their judgments of others’ claims), particular structures might still be objectionable. There’s another paper (that I thought was by Anderson, but can’t find!) that talks about the epistemic benefits of getting diverse input.
[Edit: Also, just because I’m currently reading it and it is somewhat relevant, it’s worth noting Hans Rosling’s broad summary of changes in the global population distribution:
currently there is 1 billion people in Europe, 1 billion in the Americas, 1 billion in Africa, and 4 billion in Asia. In 2100, it is predicted that there will still be 1 billion in Europe and 1 billion in the Americas, but 4 billion in Africa and 5 billion in Asia.]
Ah yes that sounds super relevant!
Unfortunately the paper is behind a paywall and I’m not a student. And while it might be fine from an individual morality basis to pay for philosophy papers I object to the academic journal system that requires it, so I can’t in good conscience shell out $45 to read it ;)
Thanks for sharing though!
[And thanks for the handy stats]
No worries, and although I’m a little unsure if it is against forum rules or whatever, this might be helpful: https://sci-hub.mksa.top/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211