Uncertainty about how to reliably affect the longterm future is much worse than uncertainty over our effects on the near-term.
I find the Hilary Greaves argument that neartermist interventions are just as unpredictable as longtermist interventions unconvincing because you could apply the same reason to treating a sick person (maybe they’ll go on to cause disaster), or getting out of bed in the morning (maybe I’ll go on to cause disaster). This paralysis is not tenable.
Disagree on the basis of cluelessness.
Uncertainty about how to reliably affect the longterm future is much worse than uncertainty over our effects on the near-term.
I find the Hilary Greaves argument that neartermist interventions are just as unpredictable as longtermist interventions unconvincing because you could apply the same reason to treating a sick person (maybe they’ll go on to cause disaster), or getting out of bed in the morning (maybe I’ll go on to cause disaster). This paralysis is not tenable.