This paper estimates that $250B would reduce biorisk by 1%. Taking Ord’s estimate of 3% biorisk this century and a population of ~8 billion, we get: $250B / (8B * .01 * .03) = $104,167/life saved via biorisk interventions.
This estimate and others in that section overestimate the person-affecting value of existential risk reduction, because in the course of the century the people presently alive will be gradually replaced by future people, and because present people will become progressively older relative to these future people. In other words, the years of life lost due to an existential catastrophe relevant from a person-affecting perspective—and hence the person-affecting value of reducing existential risk—will diminish non-negligibly over a century, both as the fraction of people who morally count shrinks and as the average life expectancy of people in this shrinking group shortens.
(Adjusting the estimates to account for this effect would strengthen your point that prioritizing existential risk reduction may require assigning moral value to future people.)
To be fair, the same issue applies to animal welfare, on a presentist view or a narrow (as opposed to wide) necessitarian view. Probably a very small share and maybe none of the targeted animals exist at the time a project is started or a donation is made, since, for example, farmed chickens only live 40 days to 2 years, and any animals that benefit would normally be ones born and raised into different systems, rather than changing practices for any animal already alive at the time of reform. They aren’t going to move live egg-laying hens out of cages into cage-free systems to keep farming them. It’s the next group of them who will just never be farmed in cages at all.
Some GiveWell charities largely benefit young children, too, but if I recall correctly, I think donations have been aimed at uses for the next year or two, so maybe only very young children would not benefit on such a person-affecting view, and this wouldn’t make much difference.
Other person-affecting views may recover much of the value of these neartermist interventions, but they do care about future people, and existential risks could dominate again in expected value per resource spent, but moreso s-risks and quality risks than extinction risks.
Probably a very small share and maybe none of the targeted animals exist at the time a project is started or a donation is made, since, for example, farmed chickens only live 40 days to 2 years, and any animals that benefit would normally be ones born and raised into different systems, rather than changing practices for any animal already alive at the time of reform. They aren’t going to move live egg-laying hens out of cages into cage-free systems to keep farming them. It’s the next group of them who will just never be farmed in cages at all.
Many animal interventions are also about trying to reduce the number of farmed animals that will exist in the future: averted lives. If you only care about currently living beings, that has no value.
Some GiveWell charities largely benefit young children, too, but if I recall correctly, I think donations have been aimed at uses for the next year or two, so maybe only very young children would not benefit on such a person-affecting view, and this wouldn’t make much difference.
Agreed that this wouldn’t make much of a difference for donations, although maybe it matters a lot for some career decisions. E.g. if future people weren’t ethically important, then there might be little value in starting a 4+ year academic degree to then donate to these charities.
(Tangentially, the time inconsistency of presentists’ preferences seems pretty inconvenient for career planning.)
I think this could make a difference for careers and education, but I’d guess not 10x in terms of cost-effectiveness of the first donations post-graduation. Most EAs will probably have already started undergraduate degrees by the time they first get into EA. There are also still benefits for the parents of children who would die, in preventing their grief and possibly economic benefits. People over 5 years old still have deaths prevented by AMF, just a few times less per dollar spent, iirc.
I’d guess few people would actually endorse presentism in particular, though.
This estimate and others in that section overestimate the person-affecting value of existential risk reduction, because in the course of the century the people presently alive will be gradually replaced by future people, and because present people will become progressively older relative to these future people. In other words, the years of life lost due to an existential catastrophe relevant from a person-affecting perspective—and hence the person-affecting value of reducing existential risk—will diminish non-negligibly over a century, both as the fraction of people who morally count shrinks and as the average life expectancy of people in this shrinking group shortens.
(Adjusting the estimates to account for this effect would strengthen your point that prioritizing existential risk reduction may require assigning moral value to future people.)
To be fair, the same issue applies to animal welfare, on a presentist view or a narrow (as opposed to wide) necessitarian view. Probably a very small share and maybe none of the targeted animals exist at the time a project is started or a donation is made, since, for example, farmed chickens only live 40 days to 2 years, and any animals that benefit would normally be ones born and raised into different systems, rather than changing practices for any animal already alive at the time of reform. They aren’t going to move live egg-laying hens out of cages into cage-free systems to keep farming them. It’s the next group of them who will just never be farmed in cages at all.
Some GiveWell charities largely benefit young children, too, but if I recall correctly, I think donations have been aimed at uses for the next year or two, so maybe only very young children would not benefit on such a person-affecting view, and this wouldn’t make much difference.
Other person-affecting views may recover much of the value of these neartermist interventions, but they do care about future people, and existential risks could dominate again in expected value per resource spent, but moreso s-risks and quality risks than extinction risks.
Many animal interventions are also about trying to reduce the number of farmed animals that will exist in the future: averted lives. If you only care about currently living beings, that has no value.
Agreed.
(I was making a general point and illustrating with welfare reforms.)
Interesting points. Yes, this further complicates the analysis.
Good points!
Agreed that this wouldn’t make much of a difference for donations, although maybe it matters a lot for some career decisions. E.g. if future people weren’t ethically important, then there might be little value in starting a 4+ year academic degree to then donate to these charities.
(Tangentially, the time inconsistency of presentists’ preferences seems pretty inconvenient for career planning.)
I think this could make a difference for careers and education, but I’d guess not 10x in terms of cost-effectiveness of the first donations post-graduation. Most EAs will probably have already started undergraduate degrees by the time they first get into EA. There are also still benefits for the parents of children who would die, in preventing their grief and possibly economic benefits. People over 5 years old still have deaths prevented by AMF, just a few times less per dollar spent, iirc.
I’d guess few people would actually endorse presentism in particular, though.