Thanks for sharing. Do you think children born from unwanted pregnancies have positive lives? If so, would the family planning intervention still be beneficial accounting for the welfare loss of the children who would have been born from the prevented unwanted pregnancies? This seems like a crucial consideration.
I remember the Collinsā being emphatically pro abortion and contraception to increase the cultural prestige and frequency of having childrenāso the poster couple of population=good seems to think contraception and abortion access does not reduce the population, all things considered. Iām not sure if the lives of unwanted children are worth starting, but I should flag that Iām generally pessimistic about which lives are worth starting.
Edit: Iām not familiar with the culture of Nigeria. My intuitions about this developed in a western context and maybe there are relevant differences in Nigeria.
Thanks for the comment. Joey Savoie, the director of strategy of Charity Entrepreneurship, which incubated Lafiya Nigeria, said:
I am far less convinced that life saving interventions are net population creating than I am that family planning decreases it.
It looks like life saving interventions decrease fertility, but still increase population. So the above suggests family planning interventions do decrease population.
The section āHow Many People Have Positive Wellbeing?ā of Chapter 9 of What We Owe the Future mentions a few data points about neutral life satisfaction:
The relative nature of the scale means that it is difficult to interpret where the neutral point should be, and unfortunately, there have been only two small studies directly addressing this question. Respondents from Ghana and Kenya put the neutral point at 0.6, while one British study places it between 1 and 2.
I think Nigeria is more like Ghana and Kenya than the United Kingdom, so people in Nigeria may put the neutral point at around 0.6. From the 2024 World Happiness Report, Nigeria had a mean life satisfaction from 2021 to 2023 of 4.88, which is significantly higher than 0.6. I assume unwanted pregnancies will be more frequent in families with life satisfaction below the mean, but 4.88 is 8.13 times (= 4.88/ā0.6) as large as 0.6, so I expect a random child that would have been born from a prevented unwanted pregnancy to have a positive life.
My low confidence best guess is that Lafiya Nigeria decreases human welfare after accounting for the effect above. Difference assumptions may lead to different conclusions, but I believe one should at least discuss the potential loss of welfare of the children whose lives are prevented.
I would be curious to know your thoughts, @Klau Chmielowska. Thanks anyway for your hardwork.
Wow, thank you for this. Youāre far more across this topic than I am, haha.
As for the effects of family planning on population levels, itās interesting that thereās such wide disagreement, although maybe itās just that the Collinsā are mistaken (wouldnāt shock me). Iād have to dig into the underlying research.
I distrust self-reports as a reliable guide in this case due to various biases (discussed by Kahneman), and my thoughts on that have been much better expressed in chapter 4 of the human predicament. Iāll need to revisit chapter 9 of WWOTF and see how their arguments and evidence compare. I would agree that an absence of positive lives (wherever the right line is) is somewhat bad, and should be a factor in decision making, although I am not a totalist or even a consequentialist (for example, I think the threshold for a live worth starting is quite above a life worth continuing). I agree that for totalists, this issue matters a lot, and for anyone uncertain about population ethics, it matters somewhat.
To clarify for certain readers, I think that the right of the woman to family planning comes first and shouldnāt be restricted. I think that foregone positive lives only has implications for prioritising among our positive obligations, not negative rights or liberties. Iām sure you agree.
To clarify for certain readers, I think that the right of the woman to family planning comes first and shouldnāt be restricted. I think that foregone positive lives only has implications for prioritising among our positive obligations, not negative rights or liberties. Iām sure you agree.
How about modeling the flow through effects on animal welfare? This may negate any decrease in human welfare, but I havenāt seen a BOTEC of this that models the income increase on the meat eating problem. I suspect it would likely still be very positive for animal welfare.
This may negate any decrease in human welfare, but I havenāt seen a BOTEC of this that models the income increase on the meat eating problem.
As suggested by the graph below, the increased income of the helped families will tend to increase their consumption of animals, which is harmful if animals have negative lives.
However, since I think family planning interventions decrease human population, I believe they decrease the consumption of animals. Yet, I am not sure this is good because farmed animalsā lives may become net positive in the next few decades, and the children who would be born from unwanted pregancies would live longer than that.
In any case, I worry the meat-eater problem is mostly a distraction. If one values 1 unit of welfare in animals as much as 1 unit of welfare in humans, and does not think Rethink Prioritiesā welfare ranges are wildly off, the best animal welfare interventions will be much more cost-effective than the best global health and development interventions. I estimate the cost-effectiveness of Shrimp Welfare Projectās (SWPās) Humane Slaughter Initiative (HSI) is 64.3 k times that of GiveWellās top charities.
Hmm, I hadnāt considered farmed animals lives becoming net positive as a case against the meat eating problem! Thanks for pointing that out.
> the best animal welfare interventions will be much more cost-effective than the best global > health and development interventions.
Iām a bit confused by this point. It still seems like if we value this framework, we should still be considering flow-through effects in questions of cause prioritization and which GHD interventions to support. I think there are also reasonable edge cases where we may be able to influence GHD interventions to have better positive flow-through effects, if the donor is not onboard with AW.
we should still be considering flow-through effects in questions of cause prioritization and which GHD interventions to support. I think there are also reasonable edge cases where we may be able to influence GHD interventions to have better positive flow-through effects, if the donor is not onboard with AW.
Agreed. By āI worry the meat-eater problem is mostly a distractionā, I meant a distraction for cause prioritisation. My sense is that people (like me) who consider the meat-eater problem to be a relevant consideration for prioritising within global health and development value 1 unit welfare in humans sufficiently similarly to 1 unit of welfare in animals to conclude that the best animal welfare interventions are much more cost-effective than the best human welfare interventions.
Vasco, where do you stand on the worry that farmed animal welfare interventions might be bad because less farmed animals=more wild animals, and wild animals have net negative lives. (Iām thinking any interventions that raise costs for farms might reduce meat consumption, and therefore number of farmed animals, at least a bit.)
I think it is very unclear whether wild animals have positive/ānegative lives, so I guess it is fine to neglect the effects on wild animals of interventions aiming to improve the welfare of farmed animals or humans. Ihaveposted about these effects, and I believe their discussion can still be useful as a way of raising awareness for wild animal welfare.
In addition, as with the meat-eater problem, I suspect the effects on wild animals are mostly a distraction for cause prioritisation. If one is confident the effects on wild animals are positive/ānegative, and that their magnitude is significant, then I would expect interventions explicitly aiming to improve the welfare of wild animals to be more cost-effective than those targetting farmed animals or humans.
Thanks for sharing. Do you think children born from unwanted pregnancies have positive lives? If so, would the family planning intervention still be beneficial accounting for the welfare loss of the children who would have been born from the prevented unwanted pregnancies? This seems like a crucial consideration.
I remember the Collinsā being emphatically pro abortion and contraception to increase the cultural prestige and frequency of having childrenāso the poster couple of population=good seems to think contraception and abortion access does not reduce the population, all things considered. Iām not sure if the lives of unwanted children are worth starting, but I should flag that Iām generally pessimistic about which lives are worth starting.
Edit: Iām not familiar with the culture of Nigeria. My intuitions about this developed in a western context and maybe there are relevant differences in Nigeria.
Thanks for the comment. Joey Savoie, the director of strategy of Charity Entrepreneurship, which incubated Lafiya Nigeria, said:
It looks like life saving interventions decrease fertility, but still increase population. So the above suggests family planning interventions do decrease population.
The section āHow Many People Have Positive Wellbeing?ā of Chapter 9 of What We Owe the Future mentions a few data points about neutral life satisfaction:
I think Nigeria is more like Ghana and Kenya than the United Kingdom, so people in Nigeria may put the neutral point at around 0.6. From the 2024 World Happiness Report, Nigeria had a mean life satisfaction from 2021 to 2023 of 4.88, which is significantly higher than 0.6. I assume unwanted pregnancies will be more frequent in families with life satisfaction below the mean, but 4.88 is 8.13 times (= 4.88/ā0.6) as large as 0.6, so I expect a random child that would have been born from a prevented unwanted pregnancy to have a positive life.
My low confidence best guess is that Lafiya Nigeria decreases human welfare after accounting for the effect above. Difference assumptions may lead to different conclusions, but I believe one should at least discuss the potential loss of welfare of the children whose lives are prevented.
I would be curious to know your thoughts, @Klau Chmielowska. Thanks anyway for your hardwork.
Wow, thank you for this. Youāre far more across this topic than I am, haha.
As for the effects of family planning on population levels, itās interesting that thereās such wide disagreement, although maybe itās just that the Collinsā are mistaken (wouldnāt shock me). Iād have to dig into the underlying research.
I distrust self-reports as a reliable guide in this case due to various biases (discussed by Kahneman), and my thoughts on that have been much better expressed in chapter 4 of the human predicament. Iāll need to revisit chapter 9 of WWOTF and see how their arguments and evidence compare. I would agree that an absence of positive lives (wherever the right line is) is somewhat bad, and should be a factor in decision making, although I am not a totalist or even a consequentialist (for example, I think the threshold for a live worth starting is quite above a life worth continuing). I agree that for totalists, this issue matters a lot, and for anyone uncertain about population ethics, it matters somewhat.
To clarify for certain readers, I think that the right of the woman to family planning comes first and shouldnāt be restricted. I think that foregone positive lives only has implications for prioritising among our positive obligations, not negative rights or liberties. Iām sure you agree.
My views are pretty close to Ariel Simnegarās.
How about modeling the flow through effects on animal welfare? This may negate any decrease in human welfare, but I havenāt seen a BOTEC of this that models the income increase on the meat eating problem. I suspect it would likely still be very positive for animal welfare.
Thanks for the comment, Nithin.
As suggested by the graph below, the increased income of the helped families will tend to increase their consumption of animals, which is harmful if animals have negative lives.
However, since I think family planning interventions decrease human population, I believe they decrease the consumption of animals. Yet, I am not sure this is good because farmed animalsā lives may become net positive in the next few decades, and the children who would be born from unwanted pregancies would live longer than that.
In any case, I worry the meat-eater problem is mostly a distraction. If one values 1 unit of welfare in animals as much as 1 unit of welfare in humans, and does not think Rethink Prioritiesā welfare ranges are wildly off, the best animal welfare interventions will be much more cost-effective than the best global health and development interventions. I estimate the cost-effectiveness of Shrimp Welfare Projectās (SWPās) Humane Slaughter Initiative (HSI) is 64.3 k times that of GiveWellās top charities.
Hmm, I hadnāt considered farmed animals lives becoming net positive as a case against the meat eating problem! Thanks for pointing that out.
> the best animal welfare interventions will be much more cost-effective than the best global > health and development interventions.
Iām a bit confused by this point. It still seems like if we value this framework, we should still be considering flow-through effects in questions of cause prioritization and which GHD interventions to support. I think there are also reasonable edge cases where we may be able to influence GHD interventions to have better positive flow-through effects, if the donor is not onboard with AW.
You are welcome!
Agreed. By āI worry the meat-eater problem is mostly a distractionā, I meant a distraction for cause prioritisation. My sense is that people (like me) who consider the meat-eater problem to be a relevant consideration for prioritising within global health and development value 1 unit welfare in humans sufficiently similarly to 1 unit of welfare in animals to conclude that the best animal welfare interventions are much more cost-effective than the best human welfare interventions.
Vasco, where do you stand on the worry that farmed animal welfare interventions might be bad because less farmed animals=more wild animals, and wild animals have net negative lives. (Iām thinking any interventions that raise costs for farms might reduce meat consumption, and therefore number of farmed animals, at least a bit.)
Interesting question, David!
I think it is very unclear whether wild animals have positive/ānegative lives, so I guess it is fine to neglect the effects on wild animals of interventions aiming to improve the welfare of farmed animals or humans. I have posted about these effects, and I believe their discussion can still be useful as a way of raising awareness for wild animal welfare.
In addition, as with the meat-eater problem, I suspect the effects on wild animals are mostly a distraction for cause prioritisation. If one is confident the effects on wild animals are positive/ānegative, and that their magnitude is significant, then I would expect interventions explicitly aiming to improve the welfare of wild animals to be more cost-effective than those targetting farmed animals or humans.