Interesting questions. Although I don’t think i know the answer to any of them better than you do, I have another possible reason, why the suffering in your situation might not be bad:
You could argue through the lens of personal identity, that if you would self-modify, not to feel pain via sympathy anymore, that the person you would turn into would not be you anymore in the morally relevant sense.
This reasoning however would only apply, if you have ethics, that care about personal Identity (for example, by caring about you or your loved ones surviving in some sense). Having preferences like that seems to be pretty intuitive, but before embracing this view I would recommend having a look at the counter arguments by Derek Parfit ( https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/#IDM ).
Interesting questions. Although I don’t think i know the answer to any of them better than you do, I have another possible reason, why the suffering in your situation might not be bad:
You could argue through the lens of personal identity, that if you would self-modify, not to feel pain via sympathy anymore, that the person you would turn into would not be you anymore in the morally relevant sense.
This reasoning however would only apply, if you have ethics, that care about personal Identity (for example, by caring about you or your loved ones surviving in some sense). Having preferences like that seems to be pretty intuitive, but before embracing this view I would recommend having a look at the counter arguments by Derek Parfit ( https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/#IDM ).