If you aggregate before taking differences, conditional on the universe/multiverse already being infinite, larger cardinalities of (dis)utilities should already be pursued with high probability, and without a way to distinguish between different outcomes with the same cardinal number of value-bearers of the same sign, it seems like the only option that makes any difference to the aggregate utility in expectation is aiming to ensure that for a given cardinal, there are fewer than that many utilities that are negative. But I’m not sure even this makes a difference. If you take expectations over the size of the universe before taking differences, the infinities dominate anyway, so you can ignore the possibility of a finite universe.
If you’re instead sensitive to the difference you make (i.e. you estimate differences before aggregating, either over individuals or the probability), then pursuing or preventing larger infinities matters again, and quality improvements may matter, too. Increasing or decreasing the probability of the universe/multiverse being infinite at all could still look valuable.
If you aggregate before taking differences, conditional on the universe/multiverse already being infinite, larger cardinalities of (dis)utilities should already be pursued with high probability, and without a way to distinguish between different outcomes with the same cardinal number of value-bearers of the same sign, it seems like the only option that makes any difference to the aggregate utility in expectation is aiming to ensure that for a given cardinal, there are fewer than that many utilities that are negative. But I’m not sure even this makes a difference. If you take expectations over the size of the universe before taking differences, the infinities dominate anyway, so you can ignore the possibility of a finite universe.
If you’re instead sensitive to the difference you make (i.e. you estimate differences before aggregating, either over individuals or the probability), then pursuing or preventing larger infinities matters again, and quality improvements may matter, too. Increasing or decreasing the probability of the universe/multiverse being infinite at all could still look valuable.