Thanks for an interesting post! I must admit that you have a great point in your analogy of the heap, even if I usually have a tendency to oppose such view that the criteria for morality changes when the scale is large enough.
One thing I find problematic in Kantian deontology at least, is the view that only intrinsically valuable thing is good will. The value of the will is dependent on what itβs oriented towards. This dependency makes the idea of the good will as fundamental good seem mistaken to me. If the destination of the will is what makes it good, how can you then claim that the good is not the object of willing, but the will itself? As I understand it, nothing can be good in itself, if its goodness is contingent.
If you disagree with Kant on this, I would like to hear your alternative.
Thanks for an interesting post! I must admit that you have a great point in your analogy of the heap, even if I usually have a tendency to oppose such view that the criteria for morality changes when the scale is large enough.
One thing I find problematic in Kantian deontology at least, is the view that only intrinsically valuable thing is good will. The value of the will is dependent on what itβs oriented towards. This dependency makes the idea of the good will as fundamental good seem mistaken to me. If the destination of the will is what makes it good, how can you then claim that the good is not the object of willing, but the will itself? As I understand it, nothing can be good in itself, if its goodness is contingent.
If you disagree with Kant on this, I would like to hear your alternative.
Well, maybe I should have read the post topics...