The way I would describe this or a similar difference in personal preference is along the lines of repeatability:
Some people feel drawn toward maximizing expected value by addressing hypothetical events that are so bad that we wouldn’t be here anymore to think about them if they happened repeatedly or had happened at all, while
other people feel drawn toward maximizing expected value by addressing events that are far less bad but happen frequently.
These repeating events have the advantage that you can test the effectiveness of your intervention on them (say, with RCTs) and improve it incrementally. Hence there is a lot more solid evidence to draw on. But solely based on that consideration, there is no better preference, just as social scientist like to say that physics is so much farther along just because it’s so much easier to study.
The way I would describe this or a similar difference in personal preference is along the lines of repeatability:
Some people feel drawn toward maximizing expected value by addressing hypothetical events that are so bad that we wouldn’t be here anymore to think about them if they happened repeatedly or had happened at all, while
other people feel drawn toward maximizing expected value by addressing events that are far less bad but happen frequently.
These repeating events have the advantage that you can test the effectiveness of your intervention on them (say, with RCTs) and improve it incrementally. Hence there is a lot more solid evidence to draw on. But solely based on that consideration, there is no better preference, just as social scientist like to say that physics is so much farther along just because it’s so much easier to study.