While I think this is a fascinating concept, and probably pretty useful as a heuristic in the real hugely uncertain world, I don’t think it addresses the root of the decision theoretic puzzles here. I—and I suspect most people? - want decision theory to give an ordering over options even assuming no background uncertainty, which SD can’t provide on its own. If option A is 100% chance of −10 utility, and option B is 50% chance of −10^20 utility else 0, it seems obvious to me that B is a very very terrible, not rationally permitted choice. But in a world with no background uncertainty A would not stochastically dominate B.
While I think this is a fascinating concept, and probably pretty useful as a heuristic in the real hugely uncertain world, I don’t think it addresses the root of the decision theoretic puzzles here. I—and I suspect most people? - want decision theory to give an ordering over options even assuming no background uncertainty, which SD can’t provide on its own. If option A is 100% chance of −10 utility, and option B is 50% chance of −10^20 utility else 0, it seems obvious to me that B is a very very terrible, not rationally permitted choice. But in a world with no background uncertainty A would not stochastically dominate B.