Sounds reasonable! Though if you can build in all the details of your specific individual situation, and are directed to do whatâs best in light of this, do you think this ends up being recognizably distinct from act consequentialism?
(Not that convergence is necessarily a problem. It can be a happy result that different theorists are âclimbing the same mountain from different sidesâ, to borrow Parfitâs metaphor. But it would at least suggest that the Kantian spin is optional, and the basic view could be just as well characterized in act consequentialist terms.)
The short answer is: I think the norm delivers meaningfully different verdicts for certain ways of cashing out âact consequentialismâ, but I imagine that you (and many other consequentialists) are going to want to say that the âPractical Kantianâ norm is compatible with act consequentialism. Iâll first discuss the practical question of deontic norms and EAâs self-conception, and then respond to the more philosophical question.
1.
If Iâm right about your view, my suggested Kantian spin would (for you) be one way among many to talk about deontic norms, which could be phrased in more explicitly act-consequentialist language. That said, I still think thereâs an argument for EA as a whole making deontic norms more central to its self-conception, as opposed to a conception where some underlying theory of the good is more central. EA is trying to intervene on peopleâs actions, after all, and your underlying theory of the good (at least in principle) underdetermines your norms for action. So, to me, it seems better to just directly highlight the deontic norms we think are valuable. EA is not a movement of moral theorists qua moral theorists, weâre a movement of people trying to do stuff that makes the world better. Even as a consequentialist, I guess that youâre only going to want involvement with a movement that shares broadly similar views to you about the action-relevant implications of consequentialism.
I want to say that I also think there should be clear public work outlining how the various deontic norms we endorse in EA clearly follow from consequentialist theories. Otherwise, I can see internal bad actors (or even just outsiders) thinking that statements about the importance of deontological norms are just about âbrand managementâ, or whatever. I think itâs important to have a consistent story about the ways in which our deontic norms related to our more foundational principles, both so that outsiders donât feel like theyâre being misled about what EA is about, and so that we have really explicit grounds on which to condemn certain behaviors as legitimately and unambiguously violating norms that we care about.
(Also, independently, Iâve (e.g.) met many people in EA who seem to flit between âEUT is the right procedure for practical decision-makingâ and âEUT is an underratedly useful toolâ â even aside from discussions of side-constraints, I donât think we have a clear conception as to what our deontic norms are, and I think this would independently beneficial. For instance, I think it would be good to have a clearer account of the procedures that really drive our prioritization decisions).
2.
On a more philosophical level, I believe that various puzzle cases in decision theory help motivate the case for treating maxims as the appropriate evaluative focal point wrt rational decision-making, rather than acts. Here are some versions of act consequentialism that I think will diverge from the Practical Kantian norm:
Kant+CDT tells you to one-box in the standard Newcomb problem, whereas Consequentialism+CDT doesnât.
Consequentialism+EDT is vulnerable XOR blackmail, whereas Kant+CDT isnât.
Perhaps there is a satisfying decision theory which, combined with act-consequentialism, provides you with (what I believe to be) the right answers to decision-theoretic puzzle cases, though Iâm currently not convinced. I think I might also disagree with you about the implications of collective action problems for consequentialism (though I agree that what you describe as âThe Rounding to Zero Fallacyâ and âThe First-Increment Fallacyâ are legitimate errors), but Iâd want to think more about those arguments before saying anything more.
Yes, agreed that what matters for EAâs purposes is agreement on its most central practical norms, which should include norms of integrity, etc., and itâs fine to have different underlying theories of what ultimately justifies these. (+ also fine, of course, to have empirical/âapplied disagreements about what we should end up prioritizing, etc., as a result..)
Iâll look forward to hearing more of your thoughts on consequentialism & collective action problems at some future point!
Sounds reasonable! Though if you can build in all the details of your specific individual situation, and are directed to do whatâs best in light of this, do you think this ends up being recognizably distinct from act consequentialism?
(Not that convergence is necessarily a problem. It can be a happy result that different theorists are âclimbing the same mountain from different sidesâ, to borrow Parfitâs metaphor. But it would at least suggest that the Kantian spin is optional, and the basic view could be just as well characterized in act consequentialist terms.)
The short answer is: I think the norm delivers meaningfully different verdicts for certain ways of cashing out âact consequentialismâ, but I imagine that you (and many other consequentialists) are going to want to say that the âPractical Kantianâ norm is compatible with act consequentialism. Iâll first discuss the practical question of deontic norms and EAâs self-conception, and then respond to the more philosophical question.
1.
If Iâm right about your view, my suggested Kantian spin would (for you) be one way among many to talk about deontic norms, which could be phrased in more explicitly act-consequentialist language. That said, I still think thereâs an argument for EA as a whole making deontic norms more central to its self-conception, as opposed to a conception where some underlying theory of the good is more central. EA is trying to intervene on peopleâs actions, after all, and your underlying theory of the good (at least in principle) underdetermines your norms for action. So, to me, it seems better to just directly highlight the deontic norms we think are valuable. EA is not a movement of moral theorists qua moral theorists, weâre a movement of people trying to do stuff that makes the world better. Even as a consequentialist, I guess that youâre only going to want involvement with a movement that shares broadly similar views to you about the action-relevant implications of consequentialism.
I want to say that I also think there should be clear public work outlining how the various deontic norms we endorse in EA clearly follow from consequentialist theories. Otherwise, I can see internal bad actors (or even just outsiders) thinking that statements about the importance of deontological norms are just about âbrand managementâ, or whatever. I think itâs important to have a consistent story about the ways in which our deontic norms related to our more foundational principles, both so that outsiders donât feel like theyâre being misled about what EA is about, and so that we have really explicit grounds on which to condemn certain behaviors as legitimately and unambiguously violating norms that we care about.
(Also, independently, Iâve (e.g.) met many people in EA who seem to flit between âEUT is the right procedure for practical decision-makingâ and âEUT is an underratedly useful toolâ â even aside from discussions of side-constraints, I donât think we have a clear conception as to what our deontic norms are, and I think this would independently beneficial. For instance, I think it would be good to have a clearer account of the procedures that really drive our prioritization decisions).
2.
On a more philosophical level, I believe that various puzzle cases in decision theory help motivate the case for treating maxims as the appropriate evaluative focal point wrt rational decision-making, rather than acts. Here are some versions of act consequentialism that I think will diverge from the Practical Kantian norm:
Kant+CDT tells you to one-box in the standard Newcomb problem, whereas Consequentialism+CDT doesnât.
Consequentialism+EDT is vulnerable XOR blackmail, whereas Kant+CDT isnât.
Perhaps there is a satisfying decision theory which, combined with act-consequentialism, provides you with (what I believe to be) the right answers to decision-theoretic puzzle cases, though Iâm currently not convinced. I think I might also disagree with you about the implications of collective action problems for consequentialism (though I agree that what you describe as âThe Rounding to Zero Fallacyâ and âThe First-Increment Fallacyâ are legitimate errors), but Iâd want to think more about those arguments before saying anything more.
Yes, agreed that what matters for EAâs purposes is agreement on its most central practical norms, which should include norms of integrity, etc., and itâs fine to have different underlying theories of what ultimately justifies these. (+ also fine, of course, to have empirical/âapplied disagreements about what we should end up prioritizing, etc., as a result..)
Iâll look forward to hearing more of your thoughts on consequentialism & collective action problems at some future point!