Sounds reasonable! Though if you can build in all the details of your specific individual situation, and are directed to do whatās best in light of this, do you think this ends up being recognizably distinct from act consequentialism?
(Not that convergence is necessarily a problem. It can be a happy result that different theorists are āclimbing the same mountain from different sidesā, to borrow Parfitās metaphor. But it would at least suggest that the Kantian spin is optional, and the basic view could be just as well characterized in act consequentialist terms.)
The short answer is: I think the norm delivers meaningfully different verdicts for certain ways of cashing out āact consequentialismā, but I imagine that you (and many other consequentialists) are going to want to say that the āPractical Kantianā norm is compatible with act consequentialism. Iāll first discuss the practical question of deontic norms and EAās self-conception, and then respond to the more philosophical question.
1.
If Iām right about your view, my suggested Kantian spin would (for you) be one way among many to talk about deontic norms, which could be phrased in more explicitly act-consequentialist language. That said, I still think thereās an argument for EA as a whole making deontic norms more central to its self-conception, as opposed to a conception where some underlying theory of the good is more central. EA is trying to intervene on peopleās actions, after all, and your underlying theory of the good (at least in principle) underdetermines your norms for action. So, to me, it seems better to just directly highlight the deontic norms we think are valuable. EA is not a movement of moral theorists qua moral theorists, weāre a movement of people trying to do stuff that makes the world better. Even as a consequentialist, I guess that youāre only going to want involvement with a movement that shares broadly similar views to you about the action-relevant implications of consequentialism.
I want to say that I also think there should be clear public work outlining how the various deontic norms we endorse in EA clearly follow from consequentialist theories. Otherwise, I can see internal bad actors (or even just outsiders) thinking that statements about the importance of deontological norms are just about ābrand managementā, or whatever. I think itās important to have a consistent story about the ways in which our deontic norms related to our more foundational principles, both so that outsiders donāt feel like theyāre being misled about what EA is about, and so that we have really explicit grounds on which to condemn certain behaviors as legitimately and unambiguously violating norms that we care about.
(Also, independently, Iāve (e.g.) met many people in EA who seem to flit between āEUT is the right procedure for practical decision-makingā and āEUT is an underratedly useful toolā ā even aside from discussions of side-constraints, I donāt think we have a clear conception as to what our deontic norms are, and I think this would independently beneficial. For instance, I think it would be good to have a clearer account of the procedures that really drive our prioritization decisions).
2.
On a more philosophical level, I believe that various puzzle cases in decision theory help motivate the case for treating maxims as the appropriate evaluative focal point wrt rational decision-making, rather than acts. Here are some versions of act consequentialism that I think will diverge from the Practical Kantian norm:
Kant+CDT tells you to one-box in the standard Newcomb problem, whereas Consequentialism+CDT doesnāt.
Consequentialism+EDT is vulnerable XOR blackmail, whereas Kant+CDT isnāt.
Perhaps there is a satisfying decision theory which, combined with act-consequentialism, provides you with (what I believe to be) the right answers to decision-theoretic puzzle cases, though Iām currently not convinced. I think I might also disagree with you about the implications of collective action problems for consequentialism (though I agree that what you describe as āThe Rounding to Zero Fallacyā and āThe First-Increment Fallacyā are legitimate errors), but Iād want to think more about those arguments before saying anything more.
Yes, agreed that what matters for EAās purposes is agreement on its most central practical norms, which should include norms of integrity, etc., and itās fine to have different underlying theories of what ultimately justifies these. (+ also fine, of course, to have empirical/āapplied disagreements about what we should end up prioritizing, etc., as a result..)
Iāll look forward to hearing more of your thoughts on consequentialism & collective action problems at some future point!
Sounds reasonable! Though if you can build in all the details of your specific individual situation, and are directed to do whatās best in light of this, do you think this ends up being recognizably distinct from act consequentialism?
(Not that convergence is necessarily a problem. It can be a happy result that different theorists are āclimbing the same mountain from different sidesā, to borrow Parfitās metaphor. But it would at least suggest that the Kantian spin is optional, and the basic view could be just as well characterized in act consequentialist terms.)
The short answer is: I think the norm delivers meaningfully different verdicts for certain ways of cashing out āact consequentialismā, but I imagine that you (and many other consequentialists) are going to want to say that the āPractical Kantianā norm is compatible with act consequentialism. Iāll first discuss the practical question of deontic norms and EAās self-conception, and then respond to the more philosophical question.
1.
If Iām right about your view, my suggested Kantian spin would (for you) be one way among many to talk about deontic norms, which could be phrased in more explicitly act-consequentialist language. That said, I still think thereās an argument for EA as a whole making deontic norms more central to its self-conception, as opposed to a conception where some underlying theory of the good is more central. EA is trying to intervene on peopleās actions, after all, and your underlying theory of the good (at least in principle) underdetermines your norms for action. So, to me, it seems better to just directly highlight the deontic norms we think are valuable. EA is not a movement of moral theorists qua moral theorists, weāre a movement of people trying to do stuff that makes the world better. Even as a consequentialist, I guess that youāre only going to want involvement with a movement that shares broadly similar views to you about the action-relevant implications of consequentialism.
I want to say that I also think there should be clear public work outlining how the various deontic norms we endorse in EA clearly follow from consequentialist theories. Otherwise, I can see internal bad actors (or even just outsiders) thinking that statements about the importance of deontological norms are just about ābrand managementā, or whatever. I think itās important to have a consistent story about the ways in which our deontic norms related to our more foundational principles, both so that outsiders donāt feel like theyāre being misled about what EA is about, and so that we have really explicit grounds on which to condemn certain behaviors as legitimately and unambiguously violating norms that we care about.
(Also, independently, Iāve (e.g.) met many people in EA who seem to flit between āEUT is the right procedure for practical decision-makingā and āEUT is an underratedly useful toolā ā even aside from discussions of side-constraints, I donāt think we have a clear conception as to what our deontic norms are, and I think this would independently beneficial. For instance, I think it would be good to have a clearer account of the procedures that really drive our prioritization decisions).
2.
On a more philosophical level, I believe that various puzzle cases in decision theory help motivate the case for treating maxims as the appropriate evaluative focal point wrt rational decision-making, rather than acts. Here are some versions of act consequentialism that I think will diverge from the Practical Kantian norm:
Kant+CDT tells you to one-box in the standard Newcomb problem, whereas Consequentialism+CDT doesnāt.
Consequentialism+EDT is vulnerable XOR blackmail, whereas Kant+CDT isnāt.
Perhaps there is a satisfying decision theory which, combined with act-consequentialism, provides you with (what I believe to be) the right answers to decision-theoretic puzzle cases, though Iām currently not convinced. I think I might also disagree with you about the implications of collective action problems for consequentialism (though I agree that what you describe as āThe Rounding to Zero Fallacyā and āThe First-Increment Fallacyā are legitimate errors), but Iād want to think more about those arguments before saying anything more.
Yes, agreed that what matters for EAās purposes is agreement on its most central practical norms, which should include norms of integrity, etc., and itās fine to have different underlying theories of what ultimately justifies these. (+ also fine, of course, to have empirical/āapplied disagreements about what we should end up prioritizing, etc., as a result..)
Iāll look forward to hearing more of your thoughts on consequentialism & collective action problems at some future point!