I find it somewhat hard to take ābut what if itās good for third world children themselves to dieā all that seriously as an objection. I think most anti-natalist philosophers would deny this. Isnāt Benatarās view that is bad for people to come into existence, but itās often better for their lives to continue once they have started. In general anti-natalists are not usually utilitarians, classical or negative.
My doubt was on the epistemics, and specifically on the estimation of welfare gain by an intervention.
Re: Benatarās view. He holds the view that the continuation of a life accrues harm. At the same time, he indeed also holds that it is overall better (or more like, less bad) for peopleās lives to continue once they have started, because death is even more significant harm.
I canāt say how many anti-natalists are utilitarians of any sort, or the reverse. I am pretty sure many negative utilitarians think that the continuation of any sentient life is net negative.
Going back to Benatarās view and applying it to our subject matter. He would likely claim that:
Continuation of the lives of third-world children is a harm in itself, both because of the expected negative welfare, and also for some other non-utilitarian reasons.
Nonetheless, letting them die is still overall bad, because dying is an even greater harm.
I find it somewhat hard to take ābut what if itās good for third world children themselves to dieā all that seriously as an objection. I think most anti-natalist philosophers would deny this. Isnāt Benatarās view that is bad for people to come into existence, but itās often better for their lives to continue once they have started. In general anti-natalists are not usually utilitarians, classical or negative.
My doubt was on the epistemics, and specifically on the estimation of welfare gain by an intervention.
Re: Benatarās view. He holds the view that the continuation of a life accrues harm. At the same time, he indeed also holds that it is overall better (or more like, less bad) for peopleās lives to continue once they have started, because death is even more significant harm.
I canāt say how many anti-natalists are utilitarians of any sort, or the reverse. I am pretty sure many negative utilitarians think that the continuation of any sentient life is net negative.
Going back to Benatarās view and applying it to our subject matter. He would likely claim that:
Continuation of the lives of third-world children is a harm in itself, both because of the expected negative welfare, and also for some other non-utilitarian reasons.
Nonetheless, letting them die is still overall bad, because dying is an even greater harm.