Among the PCIFs mentioned in section 3.2.2, I consider it to be one of the more interesting ones, principally because it may be indicative of certain kinds of “self-modeling,” and the theoretical approaches to phenomenal consciousness I intuitively find most promising are those which involve certain kinds of self-modeling.
That said, I still give it very little weight, since it’s very unclear what, exactly, different mirror-related behaviors imply about the self-modeling capacities of the animal, and how those relate to the self-modeling capacities that may be necessary for conscious experience. For example see the quotes and sources in footnote 109.
Among the PCIFs mentioned in section 3.2.2, I consider it to be one of the more interesting ones, principally because it may be indicative of certain kinds of “self-modeling,” and the theoretical approaches to phenomenal consciousness I intuitively find most promising are those which involve certain kinds of self-modeling.
That said, I still give it very little weight, since it’s very unclear what, exactly, different mirror-related behaviors imply about the self-modeling capacities of the animal, and how those relate to the self-modeling capacities that may be necessary for conscious experience. For example see the quotes and sources in footnote 109.