The OP spoke of evaluative claims (âit is better to...â and âthe conclusion that some lives are more valuable...â), so I think itâs important to be clear that those axiological claims are not reasonably disputable, and hence not reasonably regarded as ârepugnantâ or whatever.
Now, itâs a whole ânother question what should be done in light of these evaluative facts. One could argue that itâs âunacceptableâ to act upon them; that one should ignore or disregard facts about instrumental value for the purposes of deciding which life to save.
The key question then is: why? Most naturally, I think, one may worry that acting upon such differences might reinforce historical and existing social inequalities in a way that is more detrimental on net than the first-order effects of doing more immediate good. If that worry is empirically accurate, then even utilitarians will agree with the verdict that one should âscreen offâ considerations of instrumental value in oneâs decision procedure for saving lives (just as we ordinary think doctors etc. should). Saving the most (instrumentally) valuable life might not be the best thing to do, if the act itselfâor the process by which it was decidedâhas further negative consequences.
[T]here are many cases in which instrumental favoritism would seem less appropriate. We do not want emergency room doctors to pass judgment on the social value of their patients before deciding who to save, for example. And there are good utilitarian reasons for this: such judgments are apt to be unreliable, distorted by all sorts of biases regarding privilege and social status, and institutionalizing them could send a harmful stigmatizing message that undermines social solidarity. Realistically, it seems unlikely that the minor instrumental benefits to be gained from such a policy would outweigh these significant harms. So utilitarians may endorse standard rules of medical ethics that disallow medical providers from considering social value in triage or when making medical allocation decisions. But this practical point is very different from claiming that, as a matter of principle, utilitarianismâs instrumental favoritism treats others as mere means [or is otherwise inherently objectionable]. There seems no good basis for that stronger claim.
The OP spoke of evaluative claims (âit is better to...â and âthe conclusion that some lives are more valuable...â), so I think itâs important to be clear that those axiological claims are not reasonably disputable, and hence not reasonably regarded as ârepugnantâ or whatever.
Now, itâs a whole ânother question what should be done in light of these evaluative facts. One could argue that itâs âunacceptableâ to act upon them; that one should ignore or disregard facts about instrumental value for the purposes of deciding which life to save.
The key question then is: why? Most naturally, I think, one may worry that acting upon such differences might reinforce historical and existing social inequalities in a way that is more detrimental on net than the first-order effects of doing more immediate good. If that worry is empirically accurate, then even utilitarians will agree with the verdict that one should âscreen offâ considerations of instrumental value in oneâs decision procedure for saving lives (just as we ordinary think doctors etc. should). Saving the most (instrumentally) valuable life might not be the best thing to do, if the act itselfâor the process by which it was decidedâhas further negative consequences.
Again, per utilitarianism.net:
I like a lot the last paragraph pointing out to the risk of perpetuating a privileged situation based on bias. Thanks for sharing it.