Great to put the climate externality of a child explicitly in relation to other positive and negative values that come with having a child. Thanks for doing this and doing it so well.
A question: where else in the population ethics debate can I find the kind of reasoning that you employ? More specifically, where else can I find (1) lists of the bazillion positive and negative externalities of an additional child and (2) some argument—however weak—that takes us beyond agnosticism on the question whether an additional child is overall a *net* positive or negative externality (and, in case it is a net negative externality, where can I find some argument—however weak—whether it is *sufficiently* net negative so as to outweigh the value that the life has to the child itself)?
PS: I’ve laid out 9 further reasons (plus a version of the point that you make) why the initially appealing case for less children here is surprisingly unclear at closer inspection: https://twitter.com/dominicroser/status/1228295710740766721 I’ve grown convinced that the climate case for less children is much more difficult than people think and think it’s important to highlight this fact.
More specifically, where else can I find (1) lists of the bazillion positive and negative externalities of an additional child and (2) some argument—however weak—that takes us beyond agnosticism on the question whether an additional child is overall a *net* positive or negative externality
Hello Dominic,
I do something of this in my DPhil thesis in chapter 2. I’m pretty uncertain whether the Earth is under- or overpopulated whatever one’s views on population ethics.
Great to put the climate externality of a child explicitly in relation to other positive and negative values that come with having a child. Thanks for doing this and doing it so well.
A question: where else in the population ethics debate can I find the kind of reasoning that you employ? More specifically, where else can I find (1) lists of the bazillion positive and negative externalities of an additional child and (2) some argument—however weak—that takes us beyond agnosticism on the question whether an additional child is overall a *net* positive or negative externality (and, in case it is a net negative externality, where can I find some argument—however weak—whether it is *sufficiently* net negative so as to outweigh the value that the life has to the child itself)?
PS: I’ve laid out 9 further reasons (plus a version of the point that you make) why the initially appealing case for less children here is surprisingly unclear at closer inspection: https://twitter.com/dominicroser/status/1228295710740766721 I’ve grown convinced that the climate case for less children is much more difficult than people think and think it’s important to highlight this fact.
Hello Dominic,
I do something of this in my DPhil thesis in chapter 2. I’m pretty uncertain whether the Earth is under- or overpopulated whatever one’s views on population ethics.
Thanks for this, Michael! I will look at it.