Yeah, insofar as we accept biased norms of that sort, itās really important to recognize that they are merely heuristics. Reifying (or, as Scott Alexander calls it, ācrystallizingā) such heuristics into foundational moral principles risks a lot of harm.
(This is one of the themes Iām hoping to hammer home to philosophers in my next book. Besides deontic constraints, risk aversion offers another nice example.)
Yeah, insofar as we accept biased norms of that sort, itās really important to recognize that they are merely heuristics. Reifying (or, as Scott Alexander calls it, ācrystallizingā) such heuristics into foundational moral principles risks a lot of harm.
(This is one of the themes Iām hoping to hammer home to philosophers in my next book. Besides deontic constraints, risk aversion offers another nice example.)
Nice, Iāll look forward to reading this!