Sure, in principle. (Though I’d use a different term, like ‘humane farms’, to contrast with the awful conditions on what we call ‘factory farms’.) The only question is whether second-order effects from accepting such a norm might generally make it harder for people to take animal interests sufficiently seriously—see John & Sebo (2020).
The same logic would, of course, suggest there’s no intrinsic objection to humanely farming extra humans for their organs, etc. (But I think it’s clearly good for us to be appalled by that prospect: such revulsion seems part of a good moral psychology for protecting against gross mistreatment of people in other contexts. If I’m right about that, then utilitarianism will endorse our opposition to humane human farming on second-order grounds. Maybe something similar is true for non-humans, too—though I regard that as more of an open question.)
Sure, in principle. (Though I’d use a different term, like ‘humane farms’, to contrast with the awful conditions on what we call ‘factory farms’.) The only question is whether second-order effects from accepting such a norm might generally make it harder for people to take animal interests sufficiently seriously—see John & Sebo (2020).
The same logic would, of course, suggest there’s no intrinsic objection to humanely farming extra humans for their organs, etc. (But I think it’s clearly good for us to be appalled by that prospect: such revulsion seems part of a good moral psychology for protecting against gross mistreatment of people in other contexts. If I’m right about that, then utilitarianism will endorse our opposition to humane human farming on second-order grounds. Maybe something similar is true for non-humans, too—though I regard that as more of an open question.)
Thanks, Richard! That makes sense to me.