Oh yeah! They are identical in spirit, but a bit different in implementation. So they will have different results sometimes.
It would be nice to test both of them in some real world setting.
Edit: it seems that your method is more general? And that maybe you could set the curves in a way that the matching works the same as described here. So the method in this post maybe could be seen as a specific case of Mutual Matching, aiming to have some particular nice properties.
Agree with the testing question. I think there’s a lot of scope in trying to implement Mutual Matching (versions) in small or large scale, though I have not yet stumbled upon the occasion to test it in real life.
I would not say my original version of Mutual Matching is in every sense more general. But it does indeed allow the organizer some freedom to set up the scheme in a way that he deems conducive. It provides each contributor the ability to set (or know) her monotonously increasing contribution directly as a function of the leverage, which I think is really is a core criterion for an effective ‘leverage increasing’. I’m not yet 100% sure whether we here have the same knowable relationship between i’s leverage and her contribution.
Thought provoking in any case, and looking also fwd to studying it hopefully once also in more detail! Every way we can improve on the Quadratic Funding is good. Imho, really, QF mainly deserves a name of information eliciting or funds allocation rather than funding mechanism, as, while it sounds good to be able to get the ‘first best’, asymptotically all money has to come from the central funder if there are many ‘small’ donors.
I would not say my original version of Mutual Matching is in every sense more general.
Ok, I think you’re right, it’s not strictly more general.
QF mainly deserves a name of information eliciting … as … asymptotically all money has to come from the central funder if there are many ‘small’ donors
Agreed!
ability to set (or know) her monotonously increasing contribution directly as a function of the leverage, which I think is really is a core criterion for an effective ‘leverage increasing’
Yeah, that is a crucial component, but I think we need not only that, but also some natural way in which the donation saturates. Because when you keep funding some project, at some point the marginal utility from further funding decreases. (I’m not sure how original Mutual Matching deals with that.) I think Andrew Critch’s S-process deals with that very elegantly, and it would be nice to take inspiration from it. (In my method here, the individual donations saturate into some maximal personal limit, which I think is nice, but is not quite the same as the full project pot saturating.)
I think you’re describing is exactly (or almost exactly) Mutual Matching that I wrote about here on the forum a while ago: Incentivizing Donations through Mutual Matching
Oh yeah! They are identical in spirit, but a bit different in implementation. So they will have different results sometimes.
It would be nice to test both of them in some real world setting.
Edit: it seems that your method is more general? And that maybe you could set the curves in a way that the matching works the same as described here. So the method in this post maybe could be seen as a specific case of Mutual Matching, aiming to have some particular nice properties.
Agree with the testing question. I think there’s a lot of scope in trying to implement Mutual Matching (versions) in small or large scale, though I have not yet stumbled upon the occasion to test it in real life.
I would not say my original version of Mutual Matching is in every sense more general. But it does indeed allow the organizer some freedom to set up the scheme in a way that he deems conducive. It provides each contributor the ability to set (or know) her monotonously increasing contribution directly as a function of the leverage, which I think is really is a core criterion for an effective ‘leverage increasing’. I’m not yet 100% sure whether we here have the same knowable relationship between i’s leverage and her contribution.
Thought provoking in any case, and looking also fwd to studying it hopefully once also in more detail! Every way we can improve on the Quadratic Funding is good. Imho, really, QF mainly deserves a name of information eliciting or funds allocation rather than funding mechanism, as, while it sounds good to be able to get the ‘first best’, asymptotically all money has to come from the central funder if there are many ‘small’ donors.
Ok, I think you’re right, it’s not strictly more general.
Agreed!
Yeah, that is a crucial component, but I think we need not only that, but also some natural way in which the donation saturates. Because when you keep funding some project, at some point the marginal utility from further funding decreases. (I’m not sure how original Mutual Matching deals with that.) I think Andrew Critch’s S-process deals with that very elegantly, and it would be nice to take inspiration from it. (In my method here, the individual donations saturate into some maximal personal limit, which I think is nice, but is not quite the same as the full project pot saturating.)