Not OP, but it seems reasonable that if you perform an action to help someone, and that person then agrees in retrospect that they preferred this to happen, that can be seen as âfulfilling a preferenceâ.
For a mundane example, imagine Iâm ambivalent about mini-golfing. But you know me, and you suspect Iâll love it, so you take me mini-golfing. Afterwards, I enthusiastically agree that you were right, and I loved mini-golfing. I see this as pretty similar to me saying beforehand âI love mini-golfing, I wish someone would go with meâ, and you fulfilling my preference by taking me. In both cases, the end result is the same, even though I didnât actually have a preference for mini-golfing before.
Similarly, even though it is impossible for a dead person to have a preference, I think that if you bring someone back to life and they then agree that this was a fantastic idea and theyâre thrilled to be alive, that would be morally equivalent to fulfilling an active preference to live.
I agree that it is great to do something to people for which they will be thankful later. But newly created people seem just as good for this and if you care a lot about preferences you could create them in a way that they will be very thankful and the pure creation is fulfilling for them. Still donât see the value of resurrection vs new people. I think my main problem with preference utilitarianism is that you canât say whether itâs good or bad to create preferences since both has unintuitive conseqences.
For a mundane example, imagine Iâm ambivalent about mini-golfing. But you know me, and you suspect Iâll love it, so you take me mini-golfing. Afterwards, I enthusiastically agree that you were right, and I loved mini-golfing.
It seems you can accommodate this just as well, if not better, within a hedonistic viewâyou didnât prefer to go mini-golfing, but mini-golfing made you happier once you tried it, so thatâs why you endorse people encouraging you to try new things. (Although Iâm inclined to say, it really depends on what you wouldâve otherwise done with your time instead of mini-golfing, and if someone is fine not wanting something, itâs reasonable to err on the side of not making them want it.)
Not OP, but it seems reasonable that if you perform an action to help someone, and that person then agrees in retrospect that they preferred this to happen, that can be seen as âfulfilling a preferenceâ.
For a mundane example, imagine Iâm ambivalent about mini-golfing. But you know me, and you suspect Iâll love it, so you take me mini-golfing. Afterwards, I enthusiastically agree that you were right, and I loved mini-golfing. I see this as pretty similar to me saying beforehand âI love mini-golfing, I wish someone would go with meâ, and you fulfilling my preference by taking me. In both cases, the end result is the same, even though I didnât actually have a preference for mini-golfing before.
Similarly, even though it is impossible for a dead person to have a preference, I think that if you bring someone back to life and they then agree that this was a fantastic idea and theyâre thrilled to be alive, that would be morally equivalent to fulfilling an active preference to live.
Thanks for the explanation!
I agree that it is great to do something to people for which they will be thankful later. But newly created people seem just as good for this and if you care a lot about preferences you could create them in a way that they will be very thankful and the pure creation is fulfilling for them. Still donât see the value of resurrection vs new people. I think my main problem with preference utilitarianism is that you canât say whether itâs good or bad to create preferences since both has unintuitive conseqences.
It seems you can accommodate this just as well, if not better, within a hedonistic viewâyou didnât prefer to go mini-golfing, but mini-golfing made you happier once you tried it, so thatâs why you endorse people encouraging you to try new things. (Although Iâm inclined to say, it really depends on what you wouldâve otherwise done with your time instead of mini-golfing, and if someone is fine not wanting something, itâs reasonable to err on the side of not making them want it.)