I looked at WTO agreements early in the research process and eventually decided that WTO advocacy was probably not, on the margin, the best way forward.
Food stockholding
I focused on the consequences of the AoA for food stockpiling (known as “stockholding”), the most urgent concern being that it may dissuade countries from stockholding as much as they otherwise would (as suggested by Adin Richards here). Although food reserves would never be big enough to get us through a full catastrophe, they would buy time for countries to adapt to the cooling shock.
The feedback I got from someone with experience at the WTO since the 1990′s was
The AoA probably isn’t holding countries back from stockholding. It does not make any restrictions on how much a country can hold, only on how much a country can spend on subsidizing domestically-produced stocks [while technically true, a lot of authors certainly seem to believe that the AoA affects stockholding, eg. here].
This AoA appears to be counterfactually reducing subsidies for only a handful of products in a few countries. India is the only country to have notified exceeding its limit, and only for rice.
The AoA seems intractable. The G33, a coalition of LMICs, have pushed for change with no success
On the other hand, basic amendment to the AoA seems obviously needed (imho). The original agreement does not properly allow for inflation. It does not make adequate exceptions for very low-income countries (whose market share is so low that allowing them to subsidize farmers would not be very distortionary).
Overall the WTO seems deadlocked at the moment and suffering a crisis of legitimacy. Tit-for-tat between US and China has led to a breakdown of trust in the organization.
If the US was on-side for AoA amendment, it is possible that the other dissenting countries would fall in line. But it is not clear that the US can be influenced on this. The US is doing fine with the system as it currently is, and has other ways of subsidizing domestic agriculture.
Other WTO theories of change
I don’t know much about the implications of the AoA beyond stockholding.
The most important things is that we ensure trade continues in a catastrophe, which seems congruent with the AoA. The second most important thing is that countries are able to quickly adapt their food systems in a crisis. In a major catastrophe I think all WTO rules would go out of the window. But could the AoA prevent countries from preparing?
It may hold them back from stockholding, or producing much more food than the market demands. But these measures would likely be way too expensive for governments to support in the name of preparing for a 1-in-400 event, anyway.
It may prevent them from using agri subsidies to foster emerging, resilient food sources that are not economically viable in normal times. But these food sources are at an early stage of development—pilot studies at most—and my guess is that they could be pursued under academic or innovation budgets.
I may well be missing something. Are there other ways the AoA could frustrate resilience work?
Good point.
I looked at WTO agreements early in the research process and eventually decided that WTO advocacy was probably not, on the margin, the best way forward.
Food stockholding
I focused on the consequences of the AoA for food stockpiling (known as “stockholding”), the most urgent concern being that it may dissuade countries from stockholding as much as they otherwise would (as suggested by Adin Richards here). Although food reserves would never be big enough to get us through a full catastrophe, they would buy time for countries to adapt to the cooling shock.
The feedback I got from someone with experience at the WTO since the 1990′s was
The AoA probably isn’t holding countries back from stockholding. It does not make any restrictions on how much a country can hold, only on how much a country can spend on subsidizing domestically-produced stocks [while technically true, a lot of authors certainly seem to believe that the AoA affects stockholding, eg. here].
This AoA appears to be counterfactually reducing subsidies for only a handful of products in a few countries. India is the only country to have notified exceeding its limit, and only for rice.
The AoA seems intractable. The G33, a coalition of LMICs, have pushed for change with no success
On the other hand, basic amendment to the AoA seems obviously needed (imho). The original agreement does not properly allow for inflation. It does not make adequate exceptions for very low-income countries (whose market share is so low that allowing them to subsidize farmers would not be very distortionary).
Overall the WTO seems deadlocked at the moment and suffering a crisis of legitimacy. Tit-for-tat between US and China has led to a breakdown of trust in the organization.
If the US was on-side for AoA amendment, it is possible that the other dissenting countries would fall in line. But it is not clear that the US can be influenced on this. The US is doing fine with the system as it currently is, and has other ways of subsidizing domestic agriculture.
Other WTO theories of change
I don’t know much about the implications of the AoA beyond stockholding.
The most important things is that we ensure trade continues in a catastrophe, which seems congruent with the AoA. The second most important thing is that countries are able to quickly adapt their food systems in a crisis. In a major catastrophe I think all WTO rules would go out of the window. But could the AoA prevent countries from preparing?
It may hold them back from stockholding, or producing much more food than the market demands. But these measures would likely be way too expensive for governments to support in the name of preparing for a 1-in-400 event, anyway.
It may prevent them from using agri subsidies to foster emerging, resilient food sources that are not economically viable in normal times. But these food sources are at an early stage of development—pilot studies at most—and my guess is that they could be pursued under academic or innovation budgets.
I may well be missing something. Are there other ways the AoA could frustrate resilience work?
Thanks a lot for this answer