Carl suggests using units such that when a painful experience and pleasurable experience are said to be of “equal intensity” then you are morally indifferent between the two experiences
I think that’s confusing and non-standard. If your definition of intensities is itself a normative judgment, how do you even define classical utilitarianism versus suffering-focused versions? (Edit: after re-reading Carl’s post I see he proposes a way to define this in terms of energy. But my impression is still that the way I’m using “intensity,” as non-normative, is pretty common and useful.)
What I meant by my original question was: do you have an alternative definition of what it means for pain/pleasure experiences to be of “equal intensity” that is analogous to this one?
Analogous in what way? The point of my alternative definition is to provide a non-normative currency so that we can meaningfully ask what the normative ratios are (what David Althaus calls N-ratios here). So I guess I just reject the premise that an analogous definition would be useful.
ETA: If it helps to interpret my original response, I think you can substitute (up to some unit conversion) energy for intensity. In other words, my SFE intuitions aren’t derived from a comparison of suffering experiences that require a lot of energy with happy experiences that don’t require much energy. I see an asymmetry even when the experiences seem to be energetically equivalent. I don’t know enough neuroscience to say if my intuitions about energetic equivalence are accurate, but it seems to beg the question against SFE to assume that even the highest-energy happy experiences that humans currently experience involve less energy than a headache. (Not saying you’re necessarily assuming that, but I don’t see how Carl’s argument would go through without something like that.)
I think I meant analogous in the sense that I can then see how statements involving the defined word clearly translate to statements about how to make decisions. [ETA: I agree that this was underspecified and perhaps non-sensical]
I think that’s confusing and non-standard. If your definition of intensities is itself a normative judgment, how do you even define classical utilitarianism versus suffering-focused versions? (Edit: after re-reading Carl’s post I see he proposes a way to define this in terms of energy. But my impression is still that the way I’m using “intensity,” as non-normative, is pretty common and useful.)
Analogous in what way? The point of my alternative definition is to provide a non-normative currency so that we can meaningfully ask what the normative ratios are (what David Althaus calls N-ratios here). So I guess I just reject the premise that an analogous definition would be useful.
ETA: If it helps to interpret my original response, I think you can substitute (up to some unit conversion) energy for intensity. In other words, my SFE intuitions aren’t derived from a comparison of suffering experiences that require a lot of energy with happy experiences that don’t require much energy. I see an asymmetry even when the experiences seem to be energetically equivalent. I don’t know enough neuroscience to say if my intuitions about energetic equivalence are accurate, but it seems to beg the question against SFE to assume that even the highest-energy happy experiences that humans currently experience involve less energy than a headache. (Not saying you’re necessarily assuming that, but I don’t see how Carl’s argument would go through without something like that.)
I think I meant analogous in the sense that I can then see how statements involving the defined word clearly translate to statements about how to make decisions. [ETA: I agree that this was underspecified and perhaps non-sensical]