It seems to me that your account of desire as requiring affect misses a lot of what we would recognize as our own desires (or preferences) and which p-Vulcans (and Phenumb (Carruthers, 1999)) are capable of: beliefs that something would be good or bad, or better or worse, or worthy of pursuit or avoidance. This can include judgements about whatโs best for you, life satisfaction judgements, our goals, and (reasoned and) emotionally detached moral judgements. I discuss this more here.
And another kind of desire is based primarily on motivational salience, the involuntary pull of attention to that which we desire (or are averse to) or things associated with it. This is dissociable from positive and negative affect. I discuss this more here.
My piece here from which I linked the sections above may be of more general interest, too.
It seems to me that your account of desire as requiring affect misses a lot of what we would recognize as our own desires (or preferences) and which p-Vulcans (and Phenumb (Carruthers, 1999)) are capable of: beliefs that something would be good or bad, or better or worse, or worthy of pursuit or avoidance. This can include judgements about whatโs best for you, life satisfaction judgements, our goals, and (reasoned and) emotionally detached moral judgements. I discuss this more here.
And another kind of desire is based primarily on motivational salience, the involuntary pull of attention to that which we desire (or are averse to) or things associated with it. This is dissociable from positive and negative affect. I discuss this more here.
My piece here from which I linked the sections above may be of more general interest, too.