Hypothesis: in the face of cluelessness caused by flow-through effects, “paving path for future progress” may be a robust benefit of altruistic actions.
Epistemic status: off-the-cuff thoughts, highly uncertain, a hypothesis instead of a conclusion
(In this short-form I will assume a consequentialist perspective.)
Take slavery abolition as an example. The abolition of slavery seems obviously positive at the object level. But when we take into account second-order effects, things become less clear (e.g. the meater-eater problem). However, I think the bad second-order effects (if any) can plausibly be outweighed by one big second-order benefit: that the abolition of slavery paves the way for future moral progress, including (but not limited to) those around our treatment of animals. For example, it seems likely to me that in a world with slavery, it would be much harder to advocate for the rights of human minorities, of animals, and of digital sentience.
I guess this applies to many other cases too, including cases irrelevant to moral progress but relevant to some other kind of progress. This hypothesis might not change how we act by much, as we usually tend to ignore hard-to-evaluate second-order effects. This hypothesis may provide a reason why sometimes an action is justified despite of seemingly negative second-order effects, but I also worry that it may be abused, as a rationalization for ignoring flow-through effects.
Hypothesis: in the face of cluelessness caused by flow-through effects, “paving path for future progress” may be a robust benefit of altruistic actions.
Epistemic status: off-the-cuff thoughts, highly uncertain, a hypothesis instead of a conclusion
(In this short-form I will assume a consequentialist perspective.)
Take slavery abolition as an example. The abolition of slavery seems obviously positive at the object level. But when we take into account second-order effects, things become less clear (e.g. the meater-eater problem). However, I think the bad second-order effects (if any) can plausibly be outweighed by one big second-order benefit: that the abolition of slavery paves the way for future moral progress, including (but not limited to) those around our treatment of animals. For example, it seems likely to me that in a world with slavery, it would be much harder to advocate for the rights of human minorities, of animals, and of digital sentience.
I guess this applies to many other cases too, including cases irrelevant to moral progress but relevant to some other kind of progress. This hypothesis might not change how we act by much, as we usually tend to ignore hard-to-evaluate second-order effects. This hypothesis may provide a reason why sometimes an action is justified despite of seemingly negative second-order effects, but I also worry that it may be abused, as a rationalization for ignoring flow-through effects.