Executive summary: This exploratory post argues that the welfare of small soil animals like nematodes may be incommensurable with zero—meaning their welfare cannot meaningfully be compared to non-existence—and therefore population-level changes (e.g., due to agriculture or veganism) may not morally matter; this hinges on the speculative idea that welfare, like time in special relativity, is frame-dependent rather than absolute.
Key points:
Tiny soil animals are vastly numerous, and if their welfare is even slightly negative, they could dominate total suffering calculations—potentially even making animal farming net beneficial by reducing their populations.
The author argues that nematodes’ welfare is incommensurable with zero—not clearly positive, negative, or neutral—so we cannot say whether their existence adds to or detracts from total welfare.
Population-level impacts on such beings may be morally negligible: if we can’t meaningfully assign a welfare sign to their lives, increasing or decreasing their numbers doesn’t clearly raise or lower total welfare.
The concept of “welfare frames” is introduced, likened to reference frames in special relativity; just as simultaneity depends on the observer’s frame, so too might assessments of welfare depend on an observer-relative welfare frame.
This analogy implies that welfare is consistent but relative, and that for beings with small welfare ranges (like nematodes), all possible experiences might fall within their “neutral range”—making comparisons to non-existence ill-defined.
The post ends with a call for research into “neutral ranges” (not just welfare ranges), suggesting this could help clarify how we morally weigh the lives of small or simple organisms.
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Executive summary: This exploratory post argues that the welfare of small soil animals like nematodes may be incommensurable with zero—meaning their welfare cannot meaningfully be compared to non-existence—and therefore population-level changes (e.g., due to agriculture or veganism) may not morally matter; this hinges on the speculative idea that welfare, like time in special relativity, is frame-dependent rather than absolute.
Key points:
Tiny soil animals are vastly numerous, and if their welfare is even slightly negative, they could dominate total suffering calculations—potentially even making animal farming net beneficial by reducing their populations.
The author argues that nematodes’ welfare is incommensurable with zero—not clearly positive, negative, or neutral—so we cannot say whether their existence adds to or detracts from total welfare.
Population-level impacts on such beings may be morally negligible: if we can’t meaningfully assign a welfare sign to their lives, increasing or decreasing their numbers doesn’t clearly raise or lower total welfare.
The concept of “welfare frames” is introduced, likened to reference frames in special relativity; just as simultaneity depends on the observer’s frame, so too might assessments of welfare depend on an observer-relative welfare frame.
This analogy implies that welfare is consistent but relative, and that for beings with small welfare ranges (like nematodes), all possible experiences might fall within their “neutral range”—making comparisons to non-existence ill-defined.
The post ends with a call for research into “neutral ranges” (not just welfare ranges), suggesting this could help clarify how we morally weigh the lives of small or simple organisms.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.