You could have deontological commitments to prevent atrocities, too, but with an overriding commitment that you shouldn’t actively commit an atrocity, even in order to prevent a greater one. Or, something like a harm-minimizing consequentialism with deontological constraints against actively committing atrocities.
Of course, you still have to prioritize and can make mistakes, which means some atrocities may go ignored, but I think this takes away the intuitive repugnance and moral blameworthiness.
You could have deontological commitments to prevent atrocities, too, but with an overriding commitment that you shouldn’t actively commit an atrocity, even in order to prevent a greater one. Or, something like a harm-minimizing consequentialism with deontological constraints against actively committing atrocities.
Of course, you still have to prioritize and can make mistakes, which means some atrocities may go ignored, but I think this takes away the intuitive repugnance and moral blameworthiness.