I used preferences about restaurants as an example because that seemed like something people can relate to easily, but thatâs just an example. The theorem is compatible with hedonic utilitarianism. (In that case, the theorem would just prove that the groupâs utility function is the sum of each individualâs happiness.)
In this case, I think itâs harder to argue that we should care about ex ante expected individual hedonistic utility and for the 1st and 3rd axioms, because we had rationality based on preferences and something like Pareto to support these axioms before, but we could now just be concerned with the distribution of hedonistic utility in the universe, which leaves room for prioritarianism and egalitarianism. I think the only ânon-paternalisticâ and possibly objective way to aggregate hedonistic utility within an individual (over their life and/âor over uncertainty) would be to start from individual preferences/âattitudes/âdesires but just ignore concerns not about hedonism and non-hedonistic preferences, i.e. an externalist account of hedonism. Roger Crisp defends internalism in âHedonism Reconsideredâ, and defines the two terms this way:
Two types of theory of enjoyment are outlined-internalism, according to which enjoyment has some special âfeeling toneâ, and externalism, according to which enjoyment is any kind of experience to which we take some special attitude, such as that of desire.
Otherwise, I donât think thereâs any reason to believe thereâs an objective common cardinal scale for suffering and pleasure, even if there were a scale for suffering and a separate scale for pleasure. Suffering and pleasure donât use exactly the same parts of the brain, and suffering isnât just an âoppositeâ pattern to pleasure. Relying on mixed states, observing judgements when both suffering and pleasure are happening at the same time might seem promising, but these judgements happen at a higher level and probably wouldnât be consistent between people, e.g. you could have two people with exactly the same suffering and pleasure subsystems, but with different aggregating systems.
In this case, I think itâs harder to argue that we should care about ex ante expected individual hedonistic utility and for the 1st and 3rd axioms, because we had rationality based on preferences and something like Pareto to support these axioms before, but we could now just be concerned with the distribution of hedonistic utility in the universe, which leaves room for prioritarianism and egalitarianism. I think the only ânon-paternalisticâ and possibly objective way to aggregate hedonistic utility within an individual (over their life and/âor over uncertainty) would be to start from individual preferences/âattitudes/âdesires but just ignore concerns not about hedonism and non-hedonistic preferences, i.e. an externalist account of hedonism. Roger Crisp defends internalism in âHedonism Reconsideredâ, and defines the two terms this way:
Otherwise, I donât think thereâs any reason to believe thereâs an objective common cardinal scale for suffering and pleasure, even if there were a scale for suffering and a separate scale for pleasure. Suffering and pleasure donât use exactly the same parts of the brain, and suffering isnât just an âoppositeâ pattern to pleasure. Relying on mixed states, observing judgements when both suffering and pleasure are happening at the same time might seem promising, but these judgements happen at a higher level and probably wouldnât be consistent between people, e.g. you could have two people with exactly the same suffering and pleasure subsystems, but with different aggregating systems.
Iâm personally more sympathetic to externalism. With antifrustrationism (there are actually arguments for antifrustrationism; see also my comment here), externalism leads to a negative hedonistic view (which I discuss further here).